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The task of creating a system of law for real estate security
interests is a daunting one - and all the more so if it must be done very
quickly. The law of mortgages that prevails in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the other nations whose legal systems were derived
from England has had the luxury of some 600 years of development.' By
contrast, the People's Republic of China had little privately-owned real
property, and hence little need for a law of real estate security, until 1988.
From that time to the present, the Chinese government has been
aggressively building a system of real estate finance that can support
private ownership of property.
In general, this effort has been remarkably successful and stands
as a great compliment to its drafters. Loans on the security of houses,
apartments, and commercial land and buildings are made every day, and
without doubt have contributed vastly to the economic development of
China during the past decade. At the same time, however, Chinese
mortgage law has a number of serious problems - features which are
either uncertain in operation, or which are unnecessary stumbling blocks
to the smooth and efficient functioning of the market in real estate
financing.
This statement should not be taken as unduly critical of the
system's designers. To a great extent, the same could be said of real
estate finance law in the United States: that despite more than two
centuries of development here and four more in England, it continues to
exhibit some uncertainty and to impose some unnecessary barriers to the
flow of capital. The fact that the designers of the Chinese system could
achieve what they have in little more than a decade is impressive indeed.
My objective in this paper is to compare and to evaluate some of
the features of the American and Chinese systems. I do so without any
preconception that the American system provides better answers, but with
the recognition that it is far more mature and provides more answers.
Hence it provides a reference point from which the Chinese system can be
considered. Perhaps each system has something to teach the other.2
1. The origins of English mortgage law date to the 14th and 15th centuries. See Grant S.
Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 1.2 (3d ed. 1994) (hereafter cited
"Nelson & Whitman"); George S. Osborne, MORTGAGES § 6 (2d ed. 1970).
2. Because I do not read Chinese, I have necessarily relied on translations and secondary
sources for information about the laws of the People's Republic. Fortunately, an excellent book on
the subject, authored by Professor Patrick A. Randolph of the University of Missouri-Kansas City
and Professor Lou Jianbo of Beijing University, has recently been published: Patrick A. Randolph
& Lou Jianbo, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW (2000) [hereafter referred to as "Randolph & Lou"].
Much of the understanding of Chinese law reflected in this paper is traceable to the work Randolph
and Lou. An earlier version of the authors' work in this area is Patrick A. Randolph & Lou Jianbo,
Chinese Real Estate Mortgage Lav, 8 PAc. RIM L. & POL'Y. J. 515 (1999). 1 have also relied on
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I. INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW
Before turning to mortgage law issues, a brief summary of land
ownership rights in China may be helpful. After the People's Republic of
China was established in 1949, the government imposed several waves of
confiscation of land, including that of "counter-revolutionaries," land
formerly owned by the Kuo Minh Tang government, property of large
landlords, foreign capitalists, and subsequently most urban residential
property and rural agricultural land. Despite the Marxist theory that was
used to justify these confiscations, and that holds that all land is
ultimately owned by the state, individuals and families, especially in rural
areas, were acquiring land rights as early as the mid-1950s.4
State policy toward individual ownership of land use rights has
fluctuated -widely during the half century since the revolution, sometimes
favoring individual ownership and sometimes moving in the direction of
ownership by agricultural and housing collectives controlled by the state.5
Prior to 1987, the land rights "allocated" (a technical term) to private
individuals involved rather meager legal benefits. Commencing in 1987,
and confirmed by constitutional amendment in 1988 6 and by statutory
amendment in 1990, 7 the Chinese government began "granting" land use
rights to private owners, although "allocations" continue to occur as well,
primarily with respect to property intended for state, collective, or public
use. The clear trend since 1987 has been toward private ownership to use
rights in land.
Thus at present both allocated and granted land use rights exist
widely in China. The differences between the two categories are
extremely significant.8 Allocated rights are typically issued at no cost, or
only at nominal cost, to the recipient. They have no definite term, and
hence are subject to revocation without compensation. The holder of an
allocated right is required to use the land only for stated narrow, specific
Andrew J. Godwin, THE THEORY UNDERPINNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE LW IN
CHINA (2000) (Unpublished Master of Laws Thesis, University of Melbourne) [hercafter referred to
as "Godwin"].
3. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, at 14-16.
4. See Kate Xiao Zhou, How THE FARMERS CHANGED CHINA: POWFER OF THE PEOPLE
(1996) at 46, describing the advent of baochan daohu, the turning of agricultural production over to
individual households, which began in the mid-1950s and has proceeded at a steady pace since the
late 1970s.
5. Godwin, supra note 2, at 17-22.
6. P.R.C. Constitution (1982) (Amend. to Art. 10, 1988)
7. 1990 Interim Provisions for the Granting and Transfer of Land Use Rights on State
Owned Urban Land in Cities and Towns (1990). Sce Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, at 19.
8. See Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, at 85-99.
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 15 Colum. J. Asian L. 37 2001-2002
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW
purposes. The right cannot be transferred except at the discretion of the
state, and cannot be leased to a tenant (although buildings constructed by
the holder of the right are considered to belong to the right-holder and can
be leased). Allocated rights can be mortgaged (somewhat illogically,
since they cannot be transferred as of right), but there is a risk that the
government will refuse to approve the transfer that results from a
foreclosure of the mortgage. The mortgagee might apply for conversion
of the allocated right to a granted right at the time of foreclosure, but the
state may demand a substantial payment for the conversion. Thus,
lending on the security of an allocated land use right is a perilous
business.
By comparison, granted land use rights have specific, limited
terms - commonly from 30 to a maximum of 70 years. The grantee pays
a negotiated price that is ordinarily quite substantial. The granted rights
are limited in terms of use, but typically only in broad terms, similar to
those of a zoning ordinance in the United States. The granted right can be
transferred, leased, and mortgaged without state approval. If the right is
revoked, the holder is entitled to compensation. Hence in many respects,
a granted land use right is analogous to a long term ground lease in
English and American practice. However, it is technically not a lease,
and landlord-tenant law is not applicable.
There is a general expectation that granted land use rights will be
renewed upon their expiration. Existing law guarantees renewal except
when it would be contrary to the "public interest."9 However, there is no
certainty as to the interpretation of that phrase. Moreover, a renewal of a
granted right will require the holder to enter into a new contract with the
land administration and pay a new fee - which presumably will be based
on the then-current value of the land (although not the buildings
constructed by the right-holder, which are considered to be separate
property and to be owned by the right-holder). Thus renewal may be
costly, and may not be economically attractive in some cases.10
Within a few years after the 1988 legal changes mentioned above
were made, a thriving private real estate development industry developed
in China, but much of the early development occurred without mortgage
financing. Instead, many projects were financed by equity investment,
both by Chinese and offshore (mainly Asian) investors. Chinese lenders
were (and to some extent remain) distrustful of mortgage security, in
large part because of legal uncertainties and a lack of confidence that the
theoretical remedies against mortgaged land would be made available in
9. Urban Real Estate Administration Law, Section 21.
10. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, at 128-128.
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practice. For this reason, mortgage finance and mortgage law have
expanded more slowly than private ownership and land development in
China. 1
While granted land use rights plainly fall short of "fee simple
absolute" ownership as is common in the United States, 12 they
nonetheless have very substantial value, and thus far have been regarded
by mortgage lenders as tantamount to outright ownership. Allocated
rights are understandably far less attractive as security, and are generally
employed today only for property intended for public or state use. But
even granted land use rights have limitations as security for credit.
Obviously no astute mortgage lender would be willing to make a loan
secured by a granted land use right for a term exceeding the duration of
the right itself. Moreover, as granted rights begin to approach the end of
their terms, it may be that their market value will begin to decline,
perhaps precipitously, much in the same way that the value of ground-
leased property declines in England and America as its termination date
approaches. 13 But since this will not occur with respect to any granted
rights in China for a number of years, and will obviously depend on the
policies followed by the Chinese government at that time, predictions
about it are necessarily speculative. In the meantime, granted land use
rights have characteristics sufficiently similar to outright ownership in the
West that a comparison of mortgage law in the Chinese and American
systems is a sensible and useful exercise.
To compare all aspects of American and Chinese real estate
finance law would require a book, not merely an article. To keep this
paper of manageable size, I have limited it to three areas of mortgage law,
all of them extremely important. I discuss (1) transfers of mortgaged real
11. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, at 19-23.
12. While residents of the United States or England might feel uncomfortable with ownership
that is less than absolute, there is ample precedent and cultural acceptance of it in China. See
Jonathan D. Spence, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA (1990) at 14, describing the development of
a variety of forms of limited ownership of land during the Ming Dynasty, ca. 1600, as a response to
taxes imposed on the transfer of absolute ownership.
13. See, e.g., Schulem B. Association, In re Appeal from a Decision of the Leasehold
Valuation Tribunal for the London Rent Assessment Panel (2000)
<http:/wvw.courtservice.gov.uk/tribunalsflandsdecisionsdeIra 4700.htm>. The Leasehold
Valuation Tribunal hears disputes concerning the value that tenants must pay a landlord %hen
acquiring the reversion, a transaction in which London tenants are entitled to engage as a matter of
right under certain conditions. See Should I Bu, Af) Lease?
<http://iwwv.thisismoney.comfundatedmhl20.htm>; Department of the Environment, Transport
and the Regions, Leasehold Flats <http'J/wwv.housing.dtlr.gov.uklorder~flats> (last .isited Nov.20,
2001). With respect to Hawaiian ground leases, see Del Osman Realty, Hawaii Real Estate Issues:
Leasehold Ownership in Hmsaii <http'//wwwvosmanl.comleashold.html> (last visited No.v20,
2001). Both English and Hawaiian practice (as well as Japan, Hong Kong, and China) are discussed
in The Second Annual International Land Policy Forum, LAND: POSSESSION TO UTILIZATION,
FIXEDTER.M GROUND LEASE AND LAND USAGE, NATIONAL LAND AGENCY OF JAPAN (1995).
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estate, (2) transfers of mortgages and associated debt instruments
(typically promissory notes in the United States); and (3) foreclosure of
mortgages.
II. TRANSFERS OF MORTGAGED REAL ESTATE
When real estate that is subject to a mortgage is sold or otherwise
transferred, what is the mortgage's effect on the transfer? Under
American law, there are three possibilities. 14 The first (and doubtless
most frequent in practice) is that the mortgage debt will be paid in full.
The source of the funds for payment is usually the sale price, and the
payment itself is usually made directly by the escrow company, attorney,
or other "closing agent" who handles the mechanics of the sale
transaction. The closing agent is thus able to obtain from the mortgage
lender a document (usually termed a "release," a "satisfaction," or a
"reconveyance" of the mortgage) that will be recorded in the public
records, evidencing that the mortgage no longer affects title to the land.
This, in turn, permits the closing agent to authorize the issuance of a title
insurance policy, an attorney's opinion of title, or other title evidence
showing that the land is passing to the purchaser free of encumbrance by
the mortgage.
From the mortgage lender's viewpoint, this form of transfer
brings the mortgage relationship to an end. The lender's consent to the
transfer is usually unnecessary and will not be sought. The person who is
acquiring the real estate may pay cash for it. If that person needs
financing to complete the purchase, she or he may obtain a new mortgage
loan from the same or a different lender. In all events, the old lender has
no interest in the identity or qualifications of the transferee as such. The
capital that was originally lent is now returned to the lender, which may
use the funds for other loans.
Since the mortgage loan is likely to be for a long term, and the
sale of the property is likely to precede the end of that term, the transfer
of the real estate usually results in a prepayment of the mortgage debt -
that is, a payment prior to the debt's scheduled maturity. Depending on
the terms of the original mortgage, this may or may not actuate the
obligation by the borrower to pay a "prepayment fee" to the lender. 15 In
one circumstance it may be impossible to complete the sale of the real
14. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, at § 5.2. Other classic discussions are Storke and
Sears, Transfer of Mortgaged Property, 38 CORN. L. Q. 185, 187 (1953); Cunningham and
Tischler, Transfer of the Real Estate Mortgagor's Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 24 (1973).
15. If the loan documents contain a provision requiring a prepayment fee, such a fee is
generally enforceable. See generally Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage Prepayment Clauses: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 851 (1993).
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estate as outlined above. That is the situation in which the existing
mortgage loan's documents provide that it cannot be prepaid. Such a loan
is sometimes referred to as being "locked in." American courts routinely
enforce this sort of "lock-in" clause if the lender refuses to accept the
payoff.1
6
A second mode by which mortgaged real estate may be
transferred involves an agreement by the buyer and seller that the
mortgage loan will not be paid off, but will be left in place and will
continue to encumber the real estate. The buyer will take over payment
of the (usually monthly) installments owing on the debt, and will
eventually pay it off in full in the normal course of events or prepay it at
some future date.
In this form of transaction, a number of important questions arise.
First, is the mortgage lender's consent necessary in order to complete the
sale? In modem American law, the answer is nearly always yes, although
it depends on the provisions of the mortgage and the promissory note or
other obligation that the mortgage secures. Almost without exception
modem mortgages in the United States contain "due on sale" clauses.
Such a clause authorizes the lender to demand that the loan be paid in full
when the real estate is sold.'7 By virtue of a federal statute enacted in
1982, due-on-sale clauses are enforceable by lenders despite the existence
of any contrary state law.18 Hence, if such a clause is present, the lender
has the choice of whether to permit the sale to go forward, or to insist that
the loan be paid off instead.
On what basis does the lender make this choice? First, the lender
will invariably examine the proposed transferee's credit-worthiness and
ability to pay the required installments. Credit ratings, based on the
individual debtor's prior history of payment of her or his obligations, are
supplied by a number of national and regional credit reporting agencies in
the United States. The lender will obtain and review a report from one or
more of them, and may reject the proposed transferee if her or his
16. Id. See Prudential Insurance Co. n, Rand & Rec&Powers Parincrship, 141 F.3d 834 (8th
Cir. 1998); Trident Center v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988);
Riveredge Associates v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 892 (D.NJ. 1991); Clorer Square
Assoc v. Nortlnvestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 674 F. Supp. 1137 (D.NJ. 1987); Gui Associates r.
Switzer, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1636,264 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1989); Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, at §
6.2.
17. A typical clause reads as follows: "If all or any part of the Property or any Interest in the
Property is sold or transferred * ** without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may require
immediate payment in full ofall sums secured by this Security Instrument."
18. Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 at § 341, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3;
12 C.F.R. § 591.2 (regulations of Office of Thrift Supervision). See generally Grant S. Nelson and
Dale A. Whitman, Congressional Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Lmv: An Analsis of the
Garn--S. Germain Act, 35 IIASTIGS. L. J. 241 (1983); Nelson & Whitman, mspra note 1, at §§
5.22-5.26.
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payment history is judged inadequate. Second, the lender will require
submission of "underwriting" data - for example, information about the
proposed transferee's income and the type and duration of her or his
present employment. This will allow the lender to make a judgment
about whether the transferee represents an acceptable risk as a borrower.
Even if this credit, income, and employment information is
deemed satisfactory, the lender may have another reason for refusing to
permit the transferee to take over payment of the mortgage loan. If
current market interest rates are significantly higher than the rate on the
mortgage loan, the lender may demand that the loan's rate be increased to
a level approximating market rates, and may refuse to consent to the
transfer if the transferee is unwilling to agree to the increase. The rate
increase may be reflected in higher monthly payments or in the form of a
lump sum "assumption fee" to be paid to the lender at the time of the
transfer; the economic effect is substantially the same.
This latter objective of the due-on-sale clause - to ensure that the
loan's interest rate can be adjusted at the time the property is transferred,
in order to approximate the higher rates prevailing in the current
mortgage market at that time - is of far less importance to the lender if
the original mortgage loan was based on an adjustable interest rate. In the
United States, the proportion of single-family residential loans that have
adjustable rates has varied over time, ranging from as little as 12 percent
to more than 60 percent of all such loans. 19  Mortgage loans on
commercial property are much more likely to have adjustable rates. If the
loan's rate is adjustable, it will presumably be adjusted in fact in a manner
that will keep it close to market rates. Of course, the approximation will
be imperfect, since the loan's rate will adjust only at specific intervals
(e.g., perhaps once each year), and perhaps only subject to a stated ceiling
or limitation (e.g., not more than 2 percent increase in any one year),
while market rates will fluctuate constantly. Nonetheless, the
approximation may be close enough that the lender considers the further
"fine tuning" that is possible under the due-on-sale clause when the
property is sold to be unnecessary.20The effect is to limit the lender to
19. During the period 1980 to 1999, the lowest ARM market share of home mortgages was
12% in 1998; the highest was 62% in 1984. See Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 1-4-family Loan
Originations (2001) <http://www.mbaa.org/marketdata> (last visited Nov.20, 2001).
20. This is, in effect, the position of the two largest federally-sponsored secondary mortgage
market purchasing entities, Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Their
standard adjustable-rate promissory note form for one-to-four-family residential loans contains the
usual due-on-sale language, but adds to it the following provision:
"Lender also shall not exercise this option [to demand payment upon sale of the property] if:
(a) Borrower causes to be submitted to Lender information required by Lender to evaluate the
intended transferee as if a new loan were being made to the transferee; and (b) Lender reasonably
[15:i
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demanding payment only if the proposed purchaser's credit or income is
unacceptable, and not to permit the lender to demand payment because
market interest rates have risen since the loan was made.
There is a third mode in which sales of mortgaged property can
occur in the United States, but it is relatively unimportant and need detain
us only briefly.21 In this mode, the borrower pays the full agreed price for
the property in cash, but the seller does not pay off and discharge the
existing mortgage. Instead, the seller agrees (at least implicitly) to
continue making the required payments on the mortgage debt in the
ordinary course, and thus to retire it only when it reaches its scheduled
maturity. The risks of this approach to the buyer are obvious. If the
seller fails to make the payments and becomes insolvent, the buyer, who
has already paid for the property in full, may now be required to pay the
remaining balance owing on the mortgage loan in order to clear the
property's title of the mortgage encumbrance. Sophisticated real estate
purchasers almost never agree to buy under these conditions.! This
approach is sometimes used by less-reputable sellers of land, especially
subdivisions in remote locations that are marketed with "high pressure!'
sales tactics. But it is not very important in the overall scheme of real
estate sale financing in the United States.
Let us return to the second mode of sale discussed above, in
which the buyer takes over the payment of the installments owing on the
existing mortgage. Two questions arise: does the purchaser become
personally liable on the mortgage debt? And does the seller remain
liable? These questions have meaning because in most American states,2
determines that Lender's security will not be impaired by the loan assumption and that the risk of
a breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument is acceptable to Lender."
The effect is to limit the lender to demanding payment only if the proposed purchaser's credit
or income is unacceptable, and not to permit the lender to demand payment because market interest
rates have risen since the loan was made.
21. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, at § 5.2.
22. A variation of the scheme described in the text is the "%mwap-around sale," in which the
buyer does not pay all cash for the property, but instead enters into a note or contract agreeing to
pay the purchase price over time. In this setting the seller will typically receive a payment each
month from the buyer, and will also make a payment each month on the underlying loan. This
method of sale is also risky to the buyer for the reason mentioned in the text, but at least has the
advantage that the buyer has not invested the entire value of the property at the outset. In %Tap-
around" transactions, ivise buyers take precautions to ensure that, when they make their payments to
the seller, the seller's corresponding payments on the underlying mortgage loan will be made. One
way to do this has the buyer make her or his payment into an escrow account held by an
independent third party, who will then disburse the payment on the underlying loan and forward the
remainder of the funds to the seller each month. See generally Nelson & Whitman, supra note I, at
§ 9.8; St. Claire, Wraparound Mortgage Problems in Nonjudicial Forcelosures, 20 RFL EST. L. J.
221 (1992); Notes, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1059 (1990); 21 TEX. TECHI. L. REV. 873 (1990); 51
TEX. B. J. L. 1051 (1988).
23. The notable exception is California, where debtors on purchase money mortgages are
exempt from deficiency liability. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, at § 8.3. In addition,
20011
HeinOnline  -- 15 Colum. J. Asian L. 43 2001-2002
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW
most mortgage debtors are personally liable on their debts, and may be
subjected either for a judgment for the entire amount (if the lender does
not foreclose the mortgage first) or for the deficiency or remaining
indebtedness (if the lender forecloses first but does not receive a
sufficient sum from the foreclosure to pay the debt in full). It is possible
for the lender and borrower to agree, at the time the loan is made, that the
borrower will have no (or only limited) personal liability. Such loans are
termed "non-recourse" loans.24 It is fairly common for mortgage loans on
commercial real estate in the United States to contain "non-recourse"
clauses. However, residential loans, secured by one-to-four-family
homes, almost never contain such clauses, and hence give rise to personal
liability on the part of the borrower. In the absence of a non-recourse
clause, the two questions raised at the beginning of this paragraph are
both relevant: when the real estate is sold and the mortgage continues in
effect, does the purchaser become personally liable and does the seller
remain liable?
Under American law, the answer to the first question (the
personal liability of the purchaser of the real estate) depends on the
agreement of the parties - the purchaser and seller - although the
mortgage lender may play a major role in the decision. If the buyer
"assumes" the mortgage debt by promising the seller to make the
payments as they fall due,25 then the buyer becomes personally liable to
the mortgage lender as well. The usual theory is that the mortgagee is the
third party beneficiary of the buyer's assumption agreement, even if the
mortgagee was not directly a party to that agreement.26 On the other
hand, if the buyer gives no "assumption" promise, he or she undertakes
no personal liability. Such a buyer is said to have taken "subject to" the
mortgage but not to have "assumed" it. A "subject to" buyer, like one
California and a few other states have "one-action" or "security first" rules that prevent a mortgage
lender from seeking a personal judgment on the debt prior to foreclosure of the mortgage. Id. at §
8.2.
24. See Gregory M. Stein, The Scope of the Borrower's Liability in a Nonrecourse Real
Estate Loan, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (1998). Even if there is a non-recourse clause, it will
typically be subject to a lengthy list of "carve-outs" - situations in which personal recourse against
the borrower (and perhaps one or more guarantors) will exist. The carve-outs usually include
liability for fraud, waste, failure to insure, failure to apply rental revenue to operating expenses and
debt service, and the like. A lender who approves the sale of real estate subject to a loan of this sort
will almost certainly insist that the grantee assume the "carve-out" liabilities.
25. By the great majority of American cases, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable to
assumption agreements and the promise need not be in writing, See Nelson & Whitman, supra note
1, at § 5.6; Cassidy v. Bonitatibus, 39 Conn. Supp. 188, 473 A.2d 350 (1984), aff'ed5 Conn. App.
240, 497 A.2d 1018 (1985); Daugharthy v. Monritt Associates, 293 Md. 399, 444 A.2d 1030
(1982); Stevenson v. Stevenson, 618 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. Court. App. 1981).
26. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, at § 5.22; In re Cunningham, 48 B.R. 509
(Bkrtcy.Tenn.1985); City Mortg. Investment Club v. Beh, 334 A.2d 183 (D.C.App.1975);
Papamechail v. Holyoke Mutual Life Ins. Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 849, 397 N.E.2d 1153 (1979).
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who "assumes," has a strong incentive to make the payments due on the
mortgage debt, since failure to do so raises the rise that the mortgage
lender will foreclose, thereby taking the real estate away from the buyer
and risking the loss or part or all of the buyer's cash investment in the
property. But while the economic incentive to make the payments is the
same whether buyer assumes or not,27 the buyer who does not assume and
who fails to make the payments has a much smaller legal risk. The worst
that can happen to the non-assuming buyer is the loss of the property; by
comparison, the assuming buyer who defaults on the mortgage debt
payments risks both losing the property and being held personally liable
for the debt or a deficiency.
Obviously it is in the buyer's interest to avoid entering into an
assumption agreement, but in the seller's interest to persuade the buyer to
do so. 28 In theory the buyer and seller can agree that the buyer will or
will not assume, as suits them. However, the mortgage lender also has a
strong interest in getting the buyer to assume, since under the third-party
beneficiary theory mentioned earlier the buyer who assumes can be held
directly liable to the lender for the debt or a deficiency after foreclosure.
Hence, the lender may (and if properly advised, almost surely will) insist
that the buyer enter into an assumption agreement. Why is the lender's
demand persuasive to the buyer? Simply because the due-on-sale clause
in the original mortgage gives the lender the power to prevent the
transaction from occurring if the buyer and seller fail to meet its demands.
Thus the lender can condition its consent, required by the due-on-sale
clause, on the buyer's execution of the assumption agreement. 2 9 Since
due-on-sale clauses are now nearly universally found in American
mortgages, this means that an alert lender can, and as a matter of self-
27. There are a number of additional technical differences between the roles of assuming and
nonassurning buyers. They arise from the fact that a principal-surety relationship arises between the
parties if the buyer assumes, and are well beyond the scope of the present discussion. Sec
RESTATEM NT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES §§ 5.1-5.3 (1997).
28. This is true because if the buyer assumes but defaults in payment, and the seller (wvho
remains liable on the debt) is forced to pay it, the seller can seek personal subrogation,
reimbursement or exoneration of this payment from the buyer. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note
1, at § 5.10. By comparison, if the buyer does not assume, the seller can seek only subrogation
against the real estate, and no personal remedy at all against the buyer. Sce Tighe %, Walton, 233
Miss. 781, 103 So.2d 8 (1958) (subrogation); Thompson r. Miller, 195 Va. 513, 79 S.E.2d 643
(1954) (subrogation); First Interstate Bank v. Nelco Enterprises, Inc, 64 Wash. App. 158, 822 P.2d
1260 (1992) (reimbursement); Jones &, Bates, 241 S.C. 189, 127 S.E.2d 618 (1962) (exoneration).
29. The lender may go further, insisting that it be a party to the assumption agreement or that
the agreement expressly recognize its rights as a third-party beneficiary. These steps are probably
unnecessary legally, but have the virtue of clearly informing the buyer that she or he may in the
future be held directly and personally liable by the lender for the full mortgage debt.
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interest should, 30 require an assumption agreement imposing personal
liability on the buyer of the property in virtually all sales except, perhaps,
where there was a broad original non-recourse clause and hence no
personal liability on the part of the original borrower.
Now let us turn to the other question raised above: does the
original borrower continue to be personally liable after selling the real
estate to a buyer who assumes or takes subject to the mortgage? Under
traditional common-law principles, the answer to this question is
affirmative; if one undertakes personal liability - for example, on a
promissory note - one does not escape that liability by transferring the
real estate that secures the note to someone else, unless the lender is
willing at that point to give a voluntary release of liability.31 However,
the borrower is now considered a surety, with primary liability residing in
the new owner (if that person enters into an assumption agreement) or the
land (if there is no assumption agreement).32 This continued liability of
the original borrower is arguably sensible if the lender relied on that
party's income and creditworthiness in making the original loan. On the
other hand, since the lender almost invariably has the authority under its
due-on-sale clause to block a transfer in which the mortgage remains on
the property, one might argue that the lender should satisfy itself as to the
credit-worthiness of the new owner, and should be willing to forego any
claim of liability against the original borrower after it approves the sale of
the property.33Whether this language has the effect of compelling the
30. Of course this matter is open to negotiation, and it is conceivable that a buyer could offer
to pay a higher interest rate in return for the lender's willingness to forego its demand for an
assumption agreement.
31. This follows from the common law principle that a party may delegate his or her duties a
contract, but doing so does not relieve one from liability for performance of those duties. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318(c) (1981): "Unless the obligee agrees otherwise,
neither delegation of performance nor a contract to assume the duty made with the obligor by the
person delegated discharges any duty or liability of the delegating obligor." In home loans insured
by the Federal Housing Administration, the lender is required to release the borrower if the new
owner qualifies under FHA's underwriting guidelines and enters into an assumption agreement; see
24 C.F.R. § 203.510. In loans guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs, a similar rule is
followed, but the release is only of the VA's claim and not necessarily the mortgagee's; see 38
C.F.R. § 36.4323(h). It is improbable, but not impossible, that the mortgagee would have a further
claim against the original borrower after completing the VA claim process.
32. Because of the original borrower's liability being characterized as a suretyship duty, the
borrower may be discharged as a matter of law if the lender and the new owner modify the terms of
the loan. The raising of these "suretyship defenses" by the original borrower is complex and
fraught with difficult issues; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.3 (1997).
33. Indeed, perhaps this is precisely the result under the regulation of the Office of Thrift
Supervision, issued under the authority of the Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, supra note 18. See 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(4):
A lender waives its option to exercise a dueon-sale clause as to a specific transfer if, before
the transfer, the lender and the existing borrower's prospective successor in interest agree in writing
that the successor in interest will be obligated under the terms of the loan and that interest on sums
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lender to release the original borrower is uncertain. The General Counsel
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the predecessor agency of the
OTS) and one court have held that it does not. This argument has great
force in the case of residential mortgage loans, since it is often the case
that the original borrower does not realize that she or he remains liable on
the debt. Discovering, perhaps years after selling a house, that one is
being sued for a deficiency following a foreclosure action brought against
the subsequent owner can be a rude shock indeed.34
Summary and Policy Evaluation. Let us now summarize and
evaluate the way American law treats the transfers of mortgaged property.
Here are the fundamental elements of the system, with a commentary
about the equity and efficiency of each of them.
1. No lender control if loan is paid off. If the purchaser of the
property is willing to obtain new financing, rather than taking over the
existing loan, the lender has no control of the transfer whatever, and must
allow it to proceed (unless the loan is "locked in," prohibiting
prepayment).35  This feature of the American system seems
unexceptionable. If the lender is being fully repaid, it simply has no
interest in controlling the future course of ownership of the property. If
such control could be exercised, it might be used in ways that would
interfere with legitimate and efficient transfers.
2. Lender rights if transferee takes over loan. If the purchaser
wishes to take over the payments on the existing loan, the lender has
discretion as to whether or not to permit the sale to go forward, and is
legally empowered to halt the transaction is it not satisfied with it. This
power of lenders stems from the existence in nearly all mortgages of a
"due-on-sale" clause. In the absence of that clause, a lender would have
secured by the lender's security interest will be payable at a rate the lender shall request. Upon such
agreement and resultant waiver, a lender shall release the existing borrower from all obligations
under the loan instruments, and the lender is deemed to have made a new loan to the existing
borrower's successor in interest.
Whether this language has the effect of compelling the lender to release the original borrower
is uncertain. The General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the predecessor agency
of the OTS) and one court have held that it does not; see Federal Home Loan Bank Board General
Counsel Opinion Letter No. 1090, Nov. 26, 1984; Bank US4 v. Sill, 221111. App. 3d 598, 164 111.
Dec. 102, 582 N.E.2d 310 (1991). Contra Gate Cit, Fed St,. & Loan Ass'n %. Dalton, 808 P.2d
1117 (Utah Ct. App.1991) (lender has duty to release original borrower).
34. See, eg., In re Knevel, 100 B.tL 910 (Bankr. N.D.Ohio 1989), in which the owners of a
house sold it in 1980 with the purchasers assuming the mortgage, and found themselves, about nine
years later, threatened with a potential deficiency judgment by the Veteran*s Administration, %%hich
had paid the mortgagee's debt. The court refused to enjoin the VA from proceeding to collect the
deficiency, pointing out that the sellers had failed to qualify themselves under a VA procedure that
could have given them a release of liability at the time of the sale. See also Jensen . Turnage, 782
F. Supp. 1527 (M.D.Fla. 1990).
35. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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no such power. Because the due-on-sale clause is so pervasive, there
would be little practical change in American practice if lenders were
granted by statute - state or federal - a direct power to accelerate the loan
upon sale of the property. 36 The Garn Act defines a due-on-sale clause as
one that permits the lender to accelerate the loan "if all or any part of the
property, or an interest therein ... is sold or transferred. Hence, it does not
literally cover transfers of ownership interests in the entity that owns the
real estate, and state law governing clauses restricting such transfers is not
preempted by federal law. However, it seems most unlikely that any state
court would refuse to enforce such a clause. There is no judicial decision
on the point.
The public policy supporting enforcement of due-on-sale clauses
in the United States was highly controversial at one time. Some courts
held that the clause, if enforced as a means for lenders to increase the
yields on their loan portfolios, would be struck down as an invalid
restraint on alienation. However, the passage of the Garn-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act 37 in 1982 represented a preemptive rejection
of this argument by the federal government. In retrospect, it is clear that
Congress followed the better policy. The state courts that held due-on-
sale clauses unenforceable were in effect forcing lenders to finance not
only their original borrowers, but also an indefinite succession of future
owners of the land at a fixed interest rate, provided that such future
owners were credit-worthy. There was and is simply no sound basis for
forcing lenders to do this, and the results were financially catastrophic for
lenders during a period of rapidly rising interest rates.
Adjustable rate mortgage loans were not very common during the
late 1970s and early 1980s, when this controversy raged. Today they are
quite routine. Viewed from today's perspective, the notion of an
enforceable due-on-sale clause seems innocuous. If a lender can validly
enter into a contract that permits the lender to adjust the loan's interest
rate every year (or every six or three months), how can a borrower
complain about a contract (the due-on-sale clause) that permits the lender
to adjust the rate when, and only when, the property is transferred? In
36. In nonresidential mortgages, the due-on-sale clause is often very elaborate and may be
aggressively negotiated by the parties. In such mortgages, there are usually extensive provisions
dealing with the transfer of interests (e.g., shares of stock, partnership shares, etc.) in the borrower
entity. These provisions recognize that, in practical terms, there is little difference between selling
the real estate and selling a controlling interest in the entity that owns the real estate. Any statute
embodying the due-on-sale concept would have to take this sort of sale into account. Since results
of negotiations over due-on-sale clauses in commercial mortgages vary, and there is no "standard"
clause in commercial mortgages, the present system, in which federal law (the Gan Act) simply
validates the parties' negotiated clause, is more flexible than a statute embodying the due-on-sale
concept could be, and is therefore preferable. See note 18 supra.
37. See supra text accompanying note 18.
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effect, a fixed-rate mortgage loan with an enforceable due-on-sale clause
is really an adjustable-rate loan - but one whose rate adjusts only
infrequently, when the real estate is sold.
In one sense, the due-on-sale clause arguably goes too far. It
permits the lender to "call" or accelerate the loan even if the proposed
transferee of the property is fully credit-worthy and is willing to adjust the
loan's interest rate to the current market level. Obviously most lenders
would not accelerate the loan under these circumstances, simply because
it is easier to leave the loan "on the books" at the higher rate than to
relend the money to a different borrower at the same rate. Nonetheless,
the clause literally allows a lender to act arbitrarily in this setting. A
sensible alternative to the present form of the due-on-sale clause would be
a clause (or a statute regulating such clauses) that permitted acceleration
of the loan only if the proposed transferee (1) failed to meet the lender's
reasonable underwriting criteria, or (2) refused to agree to an adjustment
of the loan's interest rate to the level demanded by the lender. But this is
a relatively minor issue, since it is doubtful that lenders often act
arbitrarily.
Overall, the transition to enforceable due-on-sale clauses in the
United States has been smooth and effective. The clause is extremely
important to "portfolio lenders" - that is, those who hold large number of
fixed-interest loans in their portfolios - as distinct from lenders such as
mortgage bankers, who originate loans primarily for sale to other
investors on the secondary market. It is equally critical to secondary
market investors who hold fixed-interest mortgage loans for the long
term. Portfolio lenders and investors, especially those whose lendable
funds are derived from short-term deposits such as savings accounts, are
placed in a position of extremely high risk if they use those funds to make
long-term fixed-interest loans. The reason is obvious: if short-term
market rates rise, the lender or investor will be compelled to pay a higher
price for its money, while the yield on its long-term mortgage loan
portfolio will move upward only gradually. Such a lender or investor can
easily find itself in a deficit position in which its cost of funds exceeds its
earnings on those funds. If that situation continues for long, it is a recipe
for insolvency and failure. The due-on-sale clause provides at least some
amelioration of this problem, since it gives long-term loans a shorter
effective life as the mortgaged real estate is sold. To the extent of that
amelioration, the clause is advantageous to the nation's economy as a
whole, while at the same time it imposes no unreasonable or unfair
burden on borrowers. It thus appears that all portfolio lenders and
investors, in all nations, who hold fixed-interest loans would be well
served by the use of a mortgage clause or statute embodying the due-on-
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sale concept. This benefit would redound to deposit insurance
underwriters38 and other government agencies responsible for protecting
the health of financial institutions.
3. Personal liability of the transferee. As we have seen, the
common law, still followed in the United States, permits the transferor
and transferee to agree mutually as to whether the transferee will
undertake personal liability on the mortgage debt. As a practical matter
the mortgage lender can insist on an assumption of liability by the
transferee, since the lender's has the ability to call the loan due under the
due-on-sale clause, thus preventing the proposed transaction from
occurring, if the transferee refuses to satisfy the lender's requirements. It
is likely that most sellers of real estate and most lenders do indeed require
an assumption of liability by buyers.
This result is entirely sensible from a policy viewpoint. There is
no doubt that both lenders and sellers are at least marginally better off if
buyers assume liability - lenders because they have the right to satisfy
their loans by means of personal judgments against buyers,39 and sellers
because they have personal recourse against their buyers if they are forced
to pay the mortgage debt directly. 40 In many cases, of course, it may be
practically impossible for either the lender or seller to collect from the
buyer, but the existence of the buyer's personal liability doubtless leads to
actual recovery in at least a few cases, and provides a further incentive for
the buyer to perform the obligation in many more. The present state of
the law is desirable because it permits flexibility and enforces the parties'
private agreement, permitting the buyer to avoid personal liability if she
or he can convince the seller and lender that they should not insist on an
assumption of liability.
4. Personal liability of the transferor after the transfer is made.
The common law was clear that the seller of mortgaged real estate
remained liable on the debt after the sale occurred, unless the lender
voluntarily discharged the seller's liability.41  This seems a generally
sensible rule, on the ground that the lender initially bargained for the
seller's liability, and should be expected to give it up automatically by
38. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is the only nationwide deposit insurer in the
United States, and covers the depositors of banks, savings and loan associations, and mutual savings
banks. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, BANK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE: U.S. AND FOREIGN
EXPERIENCE MAY OFFER LESSONS FOR MODERNIZING U.S. STRUCTURE, 20-30 (1996).
39. This would not follow in California, which bars both a direct action on the debt and an
action for a deficiency following foreclosure in most settings. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note
I, at § 8.3. But California is unique among American states in this respect.
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.1 (1997).
41. As noted above, a discharge may also occur as a matter of law if the transferee and the
lender modify the terms of the loan without the transferor's consent. Cases of this sort are rare. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.3 (1997).
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virtue of approving a sale of the property to a new owner. On the other
hand, the regulation of the Office of Thrift Supervision discussed above42
may (though it is unclear) require lenders to release borrowers from
liability when they approve transfers under authority of their due-on-sale
clauses in one-to-four-family residential loans. A good policy argument
can be made for this approach as well: consumer borrowers are ill-
equipped to assess the credit-worthiness and risk that their transferees
present, and hence should not be expected to guarantee their transferees'
performance of the loan obligation once a transfer is consummated!'
Commercial borrowers are arguably more sophisticated, and can negotiate
more intelligently with their lenders about whether they 'will retain
liability when the real estate is sold.
At present, however, the major problem with American law is the
uncertainty of the meaning of the regulation just mentioned. The
regulation can be read as being either mandatory or permissive to
lenders,44 although it is difficult to see why it serves any useful purpose if
it is merely permissive. To allow such an important point to remain in
ambiguity for so long is unconscionable, but there is no discernable move
to clarify the point. American law is seriously deficient in this respect.
Chinese Lmv Comparison. In this section I will summarize and
comment upon the Chinese law equivalents of the legal principles
described above as applicable in the United States.
1. Lender control if loan is paid qff Whether the lender has any
control of a sale or other transfer that contemplates a retirement of the
loan is uncertain under Chinese law. Two statutes appear to govern this
issue. The first, "Security Law of the People's Republic of China, 'AS
referred to here as "Security Law" and adopted in 1995, is general in
nature. More detail is provided by "Measures Governing Mortgages of
Urban Real Estate,"46 issued in May 1997 and referred to here as "Urban
Mortgage Measures." Most recently, the Supreme People's Court issued
a set of interpretations of the Security Law, entitled "Several Issues
Concerning the Application of the PRC, Security Law Interpretations,"
42. Seesupra note 33.
43. The potential hardship to consumer borrowers who have sold their homes but remain
liable for their buyers' defaults is illustrated by Vail v. Brown, 841 F. Supp. 909 (D.Minn. 1994),
holding that such borrowers, on loans guaranteed by the Department of Veterans' Affairs, are
entitled to written notice of foreclosure.
44. See cases cited supra note 33.
45. The statute's background is discussed in Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 227 n.
46. Id
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effective December 13, 2000, and referred to here as "2000
Interpretations."
Under Article 49 of the Security Law, a borrower must notify the
mortgage lender before making a transfer of the property.47 Further,
Urban Mortgage Measures provides that a transfer is void unless the
lender consents to it in advance.48 Neither law limits these provisions to
cases in which the purchaser of the real estate is taking over payment of
the loan. Hence, they may be applied even in instances in which the loan
will be fully paid at the time of the transfer.49 This would, of course, be a
nonsensical result; if the lender is fully paid and the mortgage discharged,
the lender simply has no legitimate interest in the sale of the property, and
there is no reason the law should give the lender a power to withhold
consent. It appears that an amendment to Urban Mortgage Measures is
needed to clarify this point, and to establish that the lender's power of
consent is inapplicable when the loan will be fully paid.
2. Lender rights if transferee takes over loan. A fundamental
question exists under Chinese law as to whether it is possible, as a
practical matter, for a purchaser of real estate to take over an existing
mortgage debt. The Security Law provides that the proceeds of any sale
of the property must be applied to the mortgage debt.50 Since in most
cases the sale proceeds will exceed the amount of the debt, the debt will
be fully retired and the mortgage discharged. One commentator has read
the Security Law to provide that, in all cases in which the lender consents
to a transfer, the transfer must be free and clear of the mortgage - even,
perhaps, if the sale price is inadequate to fully pay the mortgage.
5
'
Randolph and Lou point out that there is no express statutory or
regulatory prohibition on the transfer of real estate subject to an existing
mortgage. 52 A debate exists among Chinese legal scholars as to whether a
47. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, § 8.8.1.
48. Id. It is possible that this provision might be applied to contracts of sale as well as to
outright transfers, thus making it impossible to enter into a valid contract of sale until the lender's
approval has been obtained. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, § 8.8.2.1.
49. A contrary interpretation arises from the text of Urban Mortgage Measures, Art. 9, which
states that a mortgage lender who wishes to restrict the borrower's leasing, transferal, or changing
of the property's use should provide for that restriction in the mortgage agreement. The obvious
implication is that the lender has no right of consent to such actions if the mortgage is silent on the
point. Moreover, it suggests that the lender could waive any restriction included in the mortgage,
and hence could authorize a sale of the property subject to the mortgage without a payoff of the
debt. It is unknown whether this view will be accepted by the Chinese authorities.
50. Chinese Security Law, Art. 49.
5 1. DANBAOFA LUJIE YU SHIYONG [EXAMPLES AND APPLICAnONS OF THE SECURITY LAW]
378-381 (Kong Xiangjun ed., 1996), paraphrased in Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, § 8.8.2.3 at
n.195.
52. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, § 8.8.2.3.
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mortgage will continue to encumber the property after a transfer;53 again,
the existing law is unclear, and the uncertainty cannot presently be
resolved.
The 2000 Interpretations of the Supreme People's Court point to
the conclusion that the mortgage will remain effective. 4 However, they
appear not to contemplate that payment of the remainder of the mortgage
debt will become the purchaser's responsibility, but rather than in all
cases it is the seller who has the duty to discharge the debt. "The assignee
who obtains ownership of the mortgaged property may discharge the
entire obligation on behalf of the debtor so as to extinguish the mortgage.
After discharging the obligation, the assignee has recourse against the
mortgagor." 55 The evident point of view of this interpretation is that is it
wrongful for the seller to pass the property to the buyer without paying
the mortgage debt in full, that the seller must have deceived the buyer into
believing that there was no mortgage, and that such a seller continues to
have primary liability to pay, and hence must reimburse the purchaser
who pays the debt in fact. This is precisely of the usual American
transaction, discussed above, in which the purchaser (or in the absence of
an assumption agreement, the purchaser's real estate) becomes primarily
liable, and the original mortgagor is liable only as a surety.
56
If the Chinese rule does indeed require that the sale proceeds be
applied against the loan, Randolph and Lou suggest that the purpose of
the rule is to avoid speculation. They postulate the case in which the
mortgage is initially obtained by a developer or builder, who then sells
the property to a consumer upon completion of construction. They
suggest that if the lender were permitted to retain the benefits of the loan
after the property was sold, the lender would have an opportunity to
speculate on the security value of the property - an opportunity that the
Chinese leadership considers undesirable from a policy viewpoint.
5 7
I do not think this explanation is persuasive. With any loan made
to finance construction, the lender contemplates that the value of the
property will increase as the loan is disbursed, and that the property when
53. See Godwin, supra note 2, at 104-108. One might infer from the legislative statement of
the lender's right to consent to a transfer that the mortgage will cease to encumber the land after the
transfer is made. But this interpretation is by no means certain. Godwin appears to be unfamiliar
vith the due-on-sale controversy in the United States, and does not recognize the legitimacy of the
lender's right to consent if the property is transferred subject to the mortgage.
54. See 2000 Interpretations, Article 67: "If the mortgagor assigns the mortgaged property
during the existence of the mortgage without notifying the mortgagee or informing the assignee
[that the property is mortgaged? - author], the mortgagee may still exercise his mortgage rights if
the mortgaged property has been registered."
55. Id
56. See supra note 27.
57. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, § 8.8.2.2 at n.190.
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finished will have a value adequate to secure the full loan amount with
some reasonable cushion of security. What is speculative about the
lender's willingness to continue to hold the loan after the property has
passed from the builder to the first occupant ... or for that matter, to later
occupants? Ordinary variations in market value of the property may
occur after the transfer, just as they may have occurred before the
transfer, but it is hard to see what socially undesirable results follow from
the lender's continuing to hold the loan.
If the present Chinese rule indeed requires that the proceeds of
sale must be applied to reduce or retire the mortgage, its effect is to force
every buyer of real estate who cannot afford to pay the purchase price in
cash to obtain her or his own new mortgage loan to finance the purchase.
By comparison, in the United States the existing lender may, at its option,
either insist upon a payoff of the loan or continue to hold it, substituting
the new owner for the old as the person expected to make the required
payments. Are there advantages to the latter system? I would suggest
that there are. When a lender is asked to make a new loan, it must first
"underwrite" the loan - that is, it must assess the risks associated with the
loan and decide whether they are acceptable. The assessment typically
focuses on two features of the loan: the value of the property and the
borrower's willingness and ability to repay. The value is determined by
means of an appraisal and a review of the title to the property, while the
borrower's willingness and ability to pay are assessed by obtaining a loan
application from the transferee, reviewing a credit report on him or her,
and verifying the proposed transferee's employment and income. 8 (This
statement describes the process for residential loans; loans on commercial
property involve more flexible and varied methods of underwriting.)
Now consider a lender who is asked to permit a transferee to take
over the payments on an existing loan. The lender must, of course,
underwrite the transferee's personal ability to pay, using the same
methods described above as applicable to a new loan. However, the
lender contemplating approval of a transferee to take over the loan need
not be concerned with underwriting the value of the property. The reason
is that it already holds the mortgage on that property. The property has
already been appraised in the past, and unless there has been unusual
deflation of real estate prices since that time, there is ordinarily no need
for a reappraisal. The acceptability of the property's title has already
been determined, and the mortgage has already been recorded so as to
58. See Wayne Passmore & Roger Sparks, THE EFFECT OF AUTOMATED UNDERWRITING ON
THE PROFITABILITY OF MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-19; Federal Trade Comm'n, Bureau of
Consumer Protection, CREDIT SCORING (1998).
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establish its priority as against other legal interests in the property. No
further review of the title is necessary when the property is sold subject to
the mortgage.
Hence, by comparison with the making of a new loan, there is an
inherent efficiency in a lender's allowing a new borrower to take over an
existing loan. The expenses of appraisal and establishment of the lender's
mortgage title, normally paid by the borrower, are saved. These are not
trivial amounts; in the United States they can easily amount to more than
a thousand dollars on the sale of a residence.5 9 In addition, the lender
saves administrative time, since it is unnecessary for members of its staff
to review and make decisions concerning the appraisal and the property's
title. The result is that, even if the lender increases the interest rate on the
loan to a level that coincides with the current market, it will probably
charge the new owner a lower "loan fee" or "origination fee" than would
be charged in the case of a new loan. This saving, added to the saving of
the appraisal and title costs, might well be in the range of one thousand to
two thousand dollars.
A further saving may occur, but to the seller rather than the buyer.
The loan documents may60 permit the lender to charge a prepayment fee
to the borrower in the event of a payoff prior to maturity. 6  However, if
the borrower is able to sell the property to a new owner who takes over
payment of the loan, no prepayment will occur and no such fee will be
due.
From this perspective, a rethinking of the present Chinese legal
restrictions on transfers subject to existing mortgages seems to be in
order. Whatever the expenses of appraisal and title establishment may be
in China, they are not zero. There is no reason to deny to proposed real
estate purchasers the efficiencies of taking over an existing loan if the
bank or other lender is willing to permit it.
3. Personal liability of the transferee. There is at present no
Chinese law with respect to the liability of transferees who take over
59. To illustrate, assume that a house sells for S130,000, with a mortgage loan amount of
S100,000. (These amounts represent a relatively modest house in most areas of the United States.)
One title company provided the following rates to the author. Owner's title insurance policy alone,
S490; lender's title insurance policy alone, S342; both policies issued simultaneously, S540.
Telephone conversation with Boone-Central Title Co., Columbia, Missouri, May 4, 2001. The cost
of an appraisal is commonly in the range of S300.
60. Prepayment fees are not common in residential mortgages in the United States, largely
because the two largest government-sponsored secondary mortgage market investors, Fannie Mae
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, do not charge such fees. However, such fees
are extremely common on nonresidential mortgages.
61. Such fees are generally enforceable in the United States; see supra note 15 and
accompanying text. They are not often charged on residential loans, but are very common with
loans on commercial real estate.
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existing mortgages. This may simply reflect the fact that it is unclear
whether such a transaction is permitted. If it is, there seems to be no
prohibition on the assumption of liability by the transferee. In light of the
broad apparent power of lenders in China to grant or to withhold consent
to transfers of mortgaged property,62 it seems entirely sensible to assume
that a lender could condition its consent upon the transferee's entering
into an assumption agreement undertaking personal liability on the debt.63
This would be analogous to United States practice under due-on-sale
clauses, and would allow lenders, borrowers, and transferees to negotiate
the assumption of liability in a mutually acceptable manner.
4. Personal liability of the transferor after the transfer is made.
There is nothing in Chinese law to suggest that a transfer of the real estate
collateral will automatically result in a discharge of the original
borrower's liability. Of course, under the statutory provisions discussed
earlier, the sale proceeds are to be applied against the debt, and may or
may not be sufficient to pay it in full. If a balance remains on the debt
after the sale, the original borrower presumably remains liable to that
extent. The provisions requiring debt payment with the sale proceeds, as
suggested above, seem to be unduly inflexible. If they can be avoided
(for example, by inclusion of appropriate language in the mortgage, a
point that is presently uncertain), it may be possible for Chinese lenders
to authorize loan assumptions by real estate purchasers with no paydown
on the indebtedness at all.
The question remains: should a seller of real estate be released
from liability on the debt when a sale is made with the approval of the
lender? We have seen earlier that in the United States this is left to the
parties' negotiation in the case of commercial real estate, and the lender
has no obligation to execute a release. However, with residential real
estate it is at least arguable that the lender has, and should have, a duty to
release the transferor when it approves the sale.64 This is a sensible result,
and one that the Chinese authorities should consider adopting. It avoids
imposing on consumers, who usually have little or no experience in loan
underwriting, the risks of default by their purchasers - risks that may
extend for many years in the future. With residential loans that risk is
best left with lenders who, after all, are professionals at assessing and
managing it.
62. See supra text accompanying note 47.
63. As Randolph & Lou observe, the transferee's assumption of the debt could be an
appropriate consideration for the lender's consent to the transfer. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, §
8.8.3.
64. See supra note 33.
[15:1
HeinOnline  -- 15 Colum. J. Asian L. 56 2001-2002
CHINESE MORTGAGE LAW
Ill. TRANSFERS OF MORTGAGES
When a lender has "originated" a loan - that is, disbursed the loan
funds to the borrower and recorded the mortgage - the loan represents an
asset to the lender, a secured right to future payment of money. In an
efficient economy, that lender must have some simple and practical
means of transferring such loans, as assets, to other investors. Transfers
of this sort make up what is usually called the "secondary mortgage
market," as distinct from transactions in which mortgage loans are
originated, and which occur in the "primary mortgage market."
Why are secondary market transfers of mortgages important?
Because they allow capital to flow to those who need to borrow it.6s The
flow of capital occurs in several dimensions. One is geographic: if a
lender originates a loan in a region that has a deficiency of available funds
to lend, and then sells the loan on the secondary market to an investor in
an region with a surplus of funds, the capital flows in the reverse
direction, to the region where it is needed.
Another dimension is the movement of capital among market
sectors. To illustrate, assume the existence of financial firms that
accumulate large amounts of capital and invest it for long terms. Typical
examples are life insurance companies and pension funds. One attractive
form of investment for such companies is mortgage lending, since
mortgage loans also tend to be for large amounts and carry relatively long
terms, thus matching the firms' investment needs. The companies in
question might open lending offices and make loans directly. However,
they may conclude that doing so is inefficient for them or requires skills
they do not possess and do not wish to acquire. An alternative
arrangement that might be more attractive to them would be to purchase
mortgage loans from other lenders who have originated them. In such
purchase transactions, the flow of capital (again, as above in the direction
opposite that of the movement of the mortgages themselves) is from the
companies that have excess lendable funds to those who have insufficient
funds. 66
65. The benefits of this capital flow are described in detail in Oliver Jones & Leo Grebler,
THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET (1961). See also Patric H. Hendershott & Kevin E. Villani.
Secondary Mortgage Markets and the Cost of Mortgage Funds, 8 RE.&L EST. ECONOMIcS 50
(1980).
66. In the United States, many of these loan originators are "mortgage bankers," a class of
company that does not receive deposits from the public and that has relatively little capital of its
own. On the development of the secondary mortgage market in America, see Robin P. Malloy, The
Secondary Mortgage Market: A Catatyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L. J. 991
(1986); Jo Anne Bradner, The Secondary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Rcal Estate
Financing, 36 EMORY L. J. 971 (1987).
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In recent years, the American secondary market has expanded in a
different direction, commonly termed "securitization. ' '67 In a securitized
transaction, a group or pool of mortgages is placed in the hands of a
trustee who represents the future securities holders. Beneficial fractional
share interests in this pool may then be sold to a large group of investors
as "participation certificates" or "PCs." These securities are "pass-
through," in the sense that each investor in a PC is entitled to her or his
pro-rata share of all of the principal and interest paid on the mortgage
loans themselves by their borrowers. In an alternative form of the
transaction, the pool of mortgages serves as collateral for the issuance of
"mortgage-backed securities" that are not necessarily of the "pass-
through" type. A variety of classes of securities can be issued on the
basis of a single pool of mortgages; some securities may pay only interest
(and no return of principal) until maturity. Some may have short
maturities and others long maturities. The classes (termed "tranches") of
securities can be designed to appeal to different groups of investors. The
arrangements for this sort of securitization are extremely complex, but
because of their broad appeal to investors, the securities can be a very
effective means of raising capital that will flow into the mortgage
market.
68
Because secondary market transfers of mortgages allow the
movement of capital in these desirable ways, the legal system should
facilitate secondary market sales and securitizations of mortgage loans,
making them as simple and reliable as possible. Unfortunately, the
American legal system has failed miserably in this respect. Perhaps the
primary reason is that our system evolved from English law that
developed in a era with few transactions, most of which were local. It has
not made the journey to a modem high-volume computerized market
well.
Under American law, a mortgage loan generates two basic
documents - a promissory note and a mortgage or mortgage-equivalent
document. 69  The promissory note is the principal evidence of the
borrower's obligation to repay the debt. The mortgage is security for
67. See Patrick D. Dolan, Lender's Guide to the Securitization of Commercial Mortgage
Loans, 115 BANKING L. J. 597 (1998); Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity:
Analyzing Real Estate Loan Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORYL. J. 519 (2001).
68. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON MARKETS FOR SMALL-BUSINESS- AND COMMERCIAL-
MORTGAGE-RELATED SECURITIES (Sept. 2000); Gregory P. Pressman, Issues in Securitized
Mortgage Lending (N.Y. Law J., Jan. 12, 1998); Alan Kronovet, An Overview of Commercial
Mortgage Backed Securitization: The Devil is in the Details, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 288 (1997).
69. About 20 states use a form of mortgage termed a "deed of trust." A few states have more
unusual forms, such as Georgia's "deed to secure debt." For most purposes these variations on the
mortgage are unimportant.
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repayment, and hence is merely ancillary to the note. When a secondary
market transfer occurs, the note represents the primary right that must be
transferred - the right to the money. The mortgage is said to "follow the
note," and in general no separate document or action is legally required in
order to transfer the mortgage, although for some purposes a document
"assigning" the mortgage is desirable.70
However, there are two bodies of law that may govern the
mechanics of transfer of the note, depending on whether the note is
considered to be "negotiable" or not. Negotiability is a technical matter,
and depends on the precise wording of the note.7' While in theory one
can read a note and determine whether it is negotiable or not, in practice
the question is often unclear.72 If the note is negotiable, the Uniform
Commercial Code dictates that the right to payment under the note can be
transferred only by delivery of the original physical document - the note
itself. No other method of transfer is possible.7 3 In effect, a negotiable
note is the reified form of the obligation itself - a concept that seems
quaint to the modem mind, and whose only parallels today are currency
70. There are two reasons a mortgage assignment is desirable. One is that in a number of
states, one is not permitted to foreclose a mortgage unless one has a recorded chain of title to the
mortgage itself, and this can be accomplished only by recording a chain of assignments in the public
records. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 45-1505(1); Mich. Comp. L. Ann. § 600.3204(c); Minn. Stat.
580.02(3); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-48-2. See Arnold v. DMR Finanical Services, Inc., 532
NAv.2d 852 (Mich. 1995) (foreclosure by holder of note who lacked a recorded chain of
assignments was voidable, not void, and would be upheld if the mortgagor was not harmed);
Family Financial Services, Inc. v Spencer, 41 Conn. App. 754, 677 A.2d 479 (1996), construing the
Connecticut recording act to deprive a mortgage assignee of standing to foreclose where the
assignment was unrecorded.
A second reason that a written, recorded assignment of the mortgage is desirable is that it is
possible that the original mortgage lender will make an unrecorded assignment and then %%ill
fraudulently and improperly purport to release the mortgage to the borrower. The borrowver will
then appear to have unencumbered title to the real estate, and make sell or mortgage it to a bona tide
purchaser (BFP). Most of the American cases uphold the BFP's claim on these facts. See. e.g.,
Ameribank Sav. Banks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 858 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.Va. 1994); Kansas City
Mortgage Co. v. Crowell, 239 So.2d 130 (Fla. App. 1970); Brenner %v. ret, 28 DII.App.2d 219, 170
N.E.2d 897 (1960). See generally Ann Burkhart, Third Paro Defenses to Mortgages, 1998 BYU L
REV. 1003, at n. 43-51.
71. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, at § 5.29.
72. Negotiability depends on the precise wording of the note, and is governed by U.C.C. § 3-
104. To be negotiable, the note must contain an "unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed
amount of money;" must be "payable to bearer or to order," must be "payable on demand or at a
definite time;" and must not "state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or
ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money," with several exceptions.
Each of these phrases is highly technical and subject to judicial interpretation. See Ronald Mann,
Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951 (1997). at n.
67-70, discussing whether the Fannie MaelFreddie Mac one-to-four-family residential mortgage
note is negotiable, and concluding that it is probably not, although the matter is uncertain.
73. U.C.C. § 3-203(a) provides that "An instrument is transferred vhen it is delivered by a
person other than the issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving deliver the right to
enforce the instrument."
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and bearer bonds. 74  On the other hand, a nonnegotiable note may be
transferred either by delivery of the note or by a separate contractual
document of assignment.
Because negotiability is often uncertain, mortgage investors in the
United States nearly always use the method of physical delivery of the
note to signify the sale of a mortgage loan on the secondary market. And
because of the advantages of having a recorded assignment of the
mortgage itself, mentioned above, such an assignment is nearly always
prepared and executed.
The result is a mess. The note must be redelivered each time
there is a secondary market transaction involving the mortgage. Since the
parties to these transactions may be located anywhere, the notes may be
transferred from one side of the country to another, and may be moved
multiple times during the life of a particular loan. They are subject to
being lost or mislaid. There is no central data base that shows which
investor owns a particular loan. When a negotiable note representing a
loan is repaid in full, the investor who holds it should, in theory, return it
to the borrower, but in many cases the note cannot be located and this is
not done.
The mortgage assignment is also problematic, although for
different reasons. If an assignment is recorded in connection with each
secondary market transaction, the recording cost, in the aggregate, is quite
significant. Moreover, recorders' offices in the United States are
typically organized at the county (or in a few states, the town) level.
There are thousands of such offices, and some of them are far from being
current in keeping up with their work load. It is not unusual for a
mortgage to be assigned a second time before the assignment representing
the first transfer is actually placed in the records by the relevant public
officials.
This two-part system has grown increasingly unsatisfactory to
American mortgage investors as the scope of the secondary mortgage
market has expanded. Finally in 1997 a group of major participants in the
mortgage market7 5 created MERS, the Mortgage Electronic Recording
system. MERS is a "book entry" clearing house that tracks both
74. The original negotiable instruments were "inland bills of exchange," typically issued by
merchants, but the concept was extended to promissory notes by the end of the eighteenth century.
The history of the holder in due course doctrine is described in James Steven Rogers, TiE EARLY
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTEs, 177-86 (1995); M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification of
Negotiable Instruments Law: A Tale of Reiterated Anachronism, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 625 (1990);
Edward L. Rubin, Learning From Lord Mansfield: Toward a Transferability Law for Modern
Commercial Practice, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 775 (1995).
75. The major organizations involved in creating MERS were Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Ginnie Mae (the Government National Mortgage Association), the Mortgage Bankers Association,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Veterans Affairs.
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ownership of mortgages and transfers of servicing rights to those
mortgages. Each time a new loan is made, lender who participates in
MERS can put the loan into the MERS system, either by making MERS
the original mortgagee or by executing an assignment to MERS
immediately after closing the loan. MERS then remains the mortgagee in
the public records for the life of the loan. Each mortgage is assigned a
"Mortgage Identification Number" for tracking purposes. MERS
maintains a record of the note-holder's identity as the note is transferred
from time to time. When the loan is traded on the. secondary market,
MERS' records are updated to reflect the change, but no further
assignment is recorded in the public records. MERS thus serves as the
nominee, for purposes of holding the real estate security, of the secondary
market investor or investors who may hold the loan from time to time.
MERS provides a number of advantages to mortgage investors.
They do not have to worry about obtaining and recording successive
assignments in local recorders' offices as loans are traded. MERS' fees
for changes in ownership of mortgages are much lower than fees for
recording assignments of mortgages typically charged by local public
recorders. Hence, secondary market investors save substantial amounts
by using MERS. Since MERS' records are entirely electronic, MERS can
provide instantaneous on-line access to information about who holds a
particular mortgage loan and who is servicing it.
As originally conceived and as now operating, MERS deals
directly only with mortgages and not notes. Hence, it solves the problems
associated with recording of mortgages, but not the problems of
misdelivered and lost notes. MERS tracks changes in ownership of notes
(which represent, under American law, actual ownership of the right to
loan payments), but only when and to the extent that such changes are
reported to it. MERS has considered, and continues to consider,
modifying its operation by undertaking to hold mortgage notes directly on
behalf of its investor members, but no decision to do so has been made at
76this point.
At the beginning of 2001 MERS had about 3.5 million mortgages
registered in its system - less than five percent of all of the outstanding
mortgages in America. But the system is expanding rapidly as new
mortgages, registered under MERS, replace older mortgages that are paid
off and discharged. As the MERS web page states, "our mission is to
register every mortgage loan in the United States on the MERS System."
76. Discussion with William C. Hultman, Senior Vice President, MERS, in Philadelphia, PA
(July 13, 2001). Having MIERS hold the note would be a major convenience, but would also raise a
risk of greater liability on the part of MERS.
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Chinese law comparison. The discussion above of the secondary
mortgage market and the securitization process will ultimately be highly
relevant in China, but perhaps not for some time.77 The reason is that
investors (whether in mortgages or in mortgage securities) have only a
limited tolerance for uncertainty, and there is yet a great deal of
uncertainty about the value of mortgage security in China. Whether most
mortgage debts will be paid without default, whether the foreclosure
process will work smoothly, and whether foreclosure will return amounts
that approximate market values are simply unknown; mortgage financing
is too new and has too short a track record.78 Hence, this section must be
understood to apply only when and to the extent that basic economic
factors permit the development of a private secondary mortgage market in
China.
First, the bifurcation of a mortgage loan's documents that is
customary in America, arising from the English concept of negotiable
instruments, is archaic and serves no purpose except confusion. There is
no reason to have two documents when one will do, and when in virtually
all cases it is desirable for the right to payment (represented in American
law by the note) and the security interest in the real estate (represented in
American law by the mortgage) to be held by the same person or entity.
There is an extremely strong presumption that the ownership of these two
rights should remain in the same hands,79 and it is difficult to postulate
any situation in which ownership of them should be divided. Yet separate
systems of perfection for the two documents continue to exist in the
United States.
Chinese law does not fall into this trap. A single document is
ordinarily used to represent these two aspects of the mortgage loan.
Indeed, they are inseparable, since Article 50 of the Security Law
provides that "a mortgage right cannot be separated from the debt [or]
separately assigned." Hence, whoever holds the debt automatically holds
77. Secondary mortgage markets and securitizations of mortgage pools are spreading
globally, although in many nations in addition to China some of the relevant laws are new and of
uncertain application. See Hideki Kanda, Securitization in Japan, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 359
(1998); Georgette C. Poindexter & Wendy Vargas-Cartaya, The Emerging Secondary Mortgage
Market in Latin America, Paper presented at the First Word Congress of the International Real
Estate Society, Anchorage, Alaska (2001); Securitization in India: Next Steps, Inaugural address by
Dr. Y.V.Reddy, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, at Seminar on Government Securities
Market, Chennai, India, April, 17, 1999,
<http://www.vinodkothari.com/secart.htm#regionalreviews> (last visited Nov.20, 2001).
78. See Patrick A. Randolph, Is Securitization an Ansver for China's Housing Needs?
WORLD SECURITIZATION NEWS & COMMENT, (Vol. 1, Issue 2, Dec. 1998, at 1); Randolph & Lou,
supra note 2, at 24-5. A housing mortgage securitization "trial" was sponsored by the Bank of
China in Shanghai in 1999; see Coudert Brothers, Editorial, China News, Issue 2 (June 1999),
<http://www.coudert.com/practice/chinanews.htm> (last visited Nov.20, 2001).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.4 (1997).
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the mortgage and vice versa.80 Likewise, it appears that a system for
public tracking of the holding of mortgages exists. It seems quite clear
that registration in the appropriate land registry is required for the
creation of a valid mortgage.8' It is plausible to assume that registration
is also the essential method of perfecting a transfer of a mortgage from
one holder or investor to another. While there is no specific statutory
support for this understanding in the Security Law, it appears to follow
from the fact that mortgages are regarded as property rights.82
However, the present registration system in China is not well
adapted to the process of transferring mortgages. The reason is the use of
multiple registries. The Security Lawv83 provides that registration must be
made in the land administration department that issued the land use rights
if there are no fixtures on the land. In the case of land with buildings,
registration must be made in the department stipulated by the local
People's Government, which may be at the county level or above.
Finally, the responsible forestry department at the county level or above
handles registrations for forest land. Two problems exist in this system
insofar as it is used to track the movement of mortgages on the secondary
market. First, mortgages on land may be registered in any one of three
local registries, depending on the use and improvements on the land.
Second, and more important, the registries are local in nature.
The American experience leading up to MERS demonstrates that
a single nationwide system for tracking ownership of mortgages is needed
to support an efficient secondary mortgage market. If mortgages are to be
transferred throughout the country, a locality-based records system makes
no sense. It is extremely inefficient for an investor in Boston or Beijing
to be forced to examine the records in Santa Fe or Shanghai in order to
determine whether the party offering to sell mortgages to the investor
really owns those mortgages or not. Even if one could expect all local
registrars to create on-line systems (an unrealistic expectation at present
in both the United States and China), it would still be inefficient for the
investor to search in multiple systems before buying a package of
mortgages. MERS has gone a long way toward solving this problem in
the United States, but it was necessary for MERS to enter the picture only
80. Godwin, supra note 2, at 54-55, 137-38.
81. Chinese Security Law Art. 41: "[R]egistration of the mortgaged property must be
undertaken and the mortgage contract will take effect from the date of registration." A heated
argument exists among Chinese legal scholars as to whether the rule as so stated is desirable, or
whether registration should be required only as against third parties (or third parties taking interests
in the property without notice of the mortgage." Most scholars seem to agree that to deny
enforcement as between the original parties on account of failure to register is unnecessarily harsh,
but that appears to be the purport of the existing law. See Godwin, supra note 2, at 112-119.
82. Godwin, supra note 2, at 56.
83. Chinese Security LawArt. 42.
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because no government or combination of governments was willing to
take the necessary steps.
No such private system should be necessary. In a nation like
China, which has the opportunity to create a system in the light of modem
mortgage practices, a single system of public registration of mortgages
should be created. The system should be nationwide, rather than based on
individual counties or provinces, since mortgages are or will be in the
future traded on a national scale. It should be maintained in electronic
form, and should be searchable on-line from anywhere in the world - a
feature that American public real estate recorders are just now beginning
to implement.
84
A further legal aspect of secondary market transfers needs
clarification under Chinese law. In the United States, mortgages and their
accompanying promissory notes are frequently pledged as security for
other debts. For example, a mortgage banking company 85 may secure a
line of credit from a commercial bank by pledging a pool of notes and
mortgages that it has originated.86 These transactions are often short in
term - lasting only a few weeks or a few months. They are nonetheless
commercially highly useful, and permit mortgage bankers to have access
to funds for loan origination that would otherwise be unavailable or
available only at a higher cost.
There is probably little demand for such transactions in China at
present, since most mortgage loans are made by banks87 using their own
funds, and no significant mortgage banking industry of the sort active in
the United States economy exists yet. However, as the Chinese mortgage
market matures, it is likely that specialized, nonportfolio mortgage
lenders will arise. They will find it very useful to be able to make use of
the mortgages they hold as security for short-term borrowings. Hence,
84. See Dale A. Whitman, Digital Recording of Real Estate Documents, 32 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 227 (1999). Current information on the progress of U.S. local recording offices in establishing
on-line electronic searching systems may be gained by a review of the interet site maintained by
the Property Records Industry Joint Task Force <http://www.prijtf.org/taskforce> (last visited
Nov.20, 2001).
85. A mortgage banker, as the term is employed in the United States, is a "non-portfolio"
lender; that is, it does not hold substantial deposits or other financial assets out of which it can make
mortgage loans. Instead, it operates by making loans, rather quickly selling or securitizing them on
the secondary market, and thereby recouping cash with which it can originate more loans.
86. This is often termed a "warehouse" line of credit, since it provides funds with which the
mortgage banker can make and accumulate a portfolio of loans. When the loans are permanently
sold to other investors on the secondary market, the notes and mortgages will be retrieved from the
commercial bank, and the line of credit will be paid down or paid off with the proceeds of the
secondary market sale. See LaMalfa, The Inside Line on Warehouse Lending, MORTGAGE
BANKING, Nov. 1990, at 51; Krasnowiecki, Miller & Ziff, The Kennedy Mortgage Co. Bankruptcy
Case, 56 AM. BANKR. L. J. 325 (1982).
87. These include specialized housing banks as well as general commercial banks, See
Nicholas R. Lardy, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIc REVOLUTION, 68-69 (1998).
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the question arises as to whether a mortgage can be effectively pledged as
security for another debt under Chinese law.
The Security Law contains two provisions on this point which
seem in practice mutually contradictory. Article 75 specifically permits
the use of a promissory note as security for a debt. However, Article 50
provides that a mortgage cannot be "used to secure another debt." Thus,
if a mortgage were originated by means of the borrower signing both a
promissory note and a mortgage, Article 75 would permit use of the note
as collateral for another debt, but the mortgage, which would be
inseparable from the note, could not be so used under Article 50.
It is not apparent that Article 50's prohibition of the use of a
mortgage right to secure another debt has any justification in terms of
good policy. It may simply reflect a lingering resistance on the part of the
drafters to the complete commodification of mortgages and other land
rights. Yet the flexibility that commodification makes possible is
essential to the development of an efficient mortgage market. The
prohibition in Article 50 should be removed to eliminate the
inconsistency and permit collateral pledges of mortgages.
Some thought must also be given to the proper means of
perfection of such pledges, an issue which seems not to have been address
in Chinese law at this point. Given the strong Chinese preference for
regarding the mortgage right as property, and for requiring registration as
a condition to the creation or transfer of mortgage rights, the logical
method of perfection of collateral pledges of mortgages would also be by
registration. As indicated above, a single nationwide registry, accessible
on-line, would be the optimal solution. Both outright transfers and
collateral pledges of mortgages should be within the scope of such a
registry.
The cost of registration is an important matter, especially in the
context of short-term financings secured by mortgages. One hears
persistent stories of individual local registries imposing outrageous fees
on an ad hoc basis for registration of mortgages. 8 This sort of unbridled
discretion is highly undesirable for the development of an efficient
mortgage market, and especially so in the context of the registration of a
short-term financing arrangement. It is essential for Chinese officials to
address the issue of registration cost.
IV. FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGES
88. Several incidents of this kind were reported at CHINESE PROPERTY LAW 1& REAL ESTATE
LAW SYMPOSIUM: THE IMPLICATION OF AMERICAN EXPERIENCES FOR CHINA, held at Beijing
University, June 16-17, 2001, and attended by the author.
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When an obligation secured by an interest in real estate is not
performed, the secured creditor usually seeks to realize on the real estate
collateral to pay the obligation. This process combines two distinct
functions: (1) determining the value of the collateral, and (2) marketing
and transferring the collateral to a new owner. The determination of
value is necessary because value establishes whether the secured creditor
is entitled to a deficiency judgment, to be collected out of the debtor's
other assets, or whether the debtor is entitled to a surplus, a return of the
part of the real estate's value that exceeds the amount owing on the
secured debt. Marketing is necessary because the mortgagee ordinarily is
not in the business of real estate ownership, and therefore needs to
liquidate the asset.
The efficacy of auctions. In most American states, foreclosure is
routinely conducted by means of an auction.89 The auction combines the
two functions above: it determines the land's value, and transfers it to a
new owner at the same time. Unfortunately, it often does these tasks
poorly.
A great deal of theoretical and empirical work has been done on
auctions, including auctions of real property. One of the core questions
this work addresses is whether the price produced at by an auction sale is
likely to be equivalent to, higher than, or lower than the price that the
same property would bring in a negotiated sale. The question is highly
relevant to the development of Chinese foreclosure law; if auctions
usually bring equivalent or higher prices than negotiated sales, they
should be a favored, or perhaps the only, foreclosure mechanism. On the
other hand, if auctions tend to bring prices that are systematically lower
than negotiated sales, they should be disfavored, and other marketing
mechanisms should be employed in foreclosure. There seem to be no
empirical data on real estate auctions in China, perhaps because private
real estate sales have occurred there for a relatively short time. Studies of
the efficacy of real estate auctions in other countries may, however, be
illuminating.
There are, of course, many ways of arranging auction sales.90
However, the sort of auction I address here, and the sort nearly always
employed for foreclosure sales in the United States, is often termed the
89. Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in
Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 846 (1980); Nelson & Whitman, supra note
2, at § 7.19.
90. For example, bids may be submitted only in writing, each bidder may be limited to a
single bid, and so on.
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"English auction." 91 In an English auction, bidders physically congregate
in a single location. They call their bids orally, so that each bidder is
immediately aware of the bids of others. Bids move progressively
upward. An individual may bid multiple times, and the sale is awarded to
the highest bidder. The selling price in an English auction is determined
by the opinion of value of the second-highest bidder - the runner-up.
This follows from the fact that the second-highest bidder, by definition,
has decided not to increase his or her bid, suggesting that that bid is the
limit of the runner-up bidder's opinion of value. The high bidder need
bid only a nominal amount - say, one dollar - above the runner-up's top
bid in order to take the property, even if the high bidder's opinion of the
property's value is much greater than that amount.
Auctions can have significant advantages over a negotiated sale
for both buyers and seller. Assuming that any reserve price has been met,
the seller cannot withdraw or renege on the transaction; hence,
indeterminacy is reduced for the buyer. From the seller's viewpoint, the
auction is quick and permits a rapid liquidation of the asset. In addition,
if there are numerous well-informed bidders, even a seller who is
relatively uninformed or ignorant of market conditions can expect to
obtain a market price.92
However, there is at least one theoretical reason for expecting
English auctions to produce prices that are inferior to prices in negotiated
sales. It arises from the fact that it must, by its nature, occur at a given
point in time, and can only attract potential buyers who are in the market
at that time. By contrast, a negotiated sale typically results from the
marketing of the property over some period of time - often several weeks
or months. Since prospective buyers may enter or leave the market at
random intervals, a longer exposure time is likely to result in exposure to
more potential buyers, and thus to a higher probable price.93 An auction's
appeal is inherently limited to the potential buyers who are active on the
date the auction is held.94 Moreover, in a small market or one that is
91. See P.R. Milgrom & RI.. Weber, A Theorv, of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOmTRmCA 1089 (1982).
92. See Mark G. Dotzour, Everard Moorhead, and Daniel T. Winker, The Impact ofAuctions
on Residential Sales Prices in New Zealand, 16 J. REAL EST. RES. 57,58 (1998).
93. There is evidence that, even with negotiated sales, longer periods of time on the market
are associated with higher prices paid. See John D. Benjamin, G. Donald Jud, & G. Stacy Sirmans,
WhatiDo We Know'About RealEstate Brokerage, 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 6, 14-16(2000).
94. In recent years, there has been some experimentation with on-line auctions of real estate
by means of the interet. See, e.g., <http:.1wwv.bid4assets.com>;
http://www.realauctionreferral.comfrealestate.htm1 (both sites last visited Nov.20, 2001); Jackie
Spinner, Uncle Sam Gets Web Auction Bug; GSA Finds Public Rcadv and Willing to Bu), WAS11.
POST, June 12, 2001, at El available at 2001 WL 23173507; Gus G. Sentementes, Web Auctions
Have Homes to Sell Going, Going: Several Dot-Com Companies See a Future in Selling Real Estate
via Bidding Through the Internet, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 22, 2000, at IL. There is some a priori
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already "glutted" by oversupply, an auction in which a large number of
properties are offered may itself depress prices as a consequence of the
increase in supply resulting from "dumping" the entire auction inventory
on the market in a single day.
95
A number of factors may influence prices brought by auctions. In
the United States, auctions have historically been associated in the public
mind with distress sales. Most auctions in America result from mortgage
foreclosures, judgment sales, property tax sales, bankruptcy sales, and
estate sales. Well-publicized auctions have also been held in recent years
in the United States by the Resolution Trust Corporation, which was
charged with the responsibility for liquidating the assets of insolvent
savings and loan associations from 1989 through 1997,96 and by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, which holds an
inventory of foreclosed houses whose owners defaulted on mortgage
loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration.97 These, too, are
examples of distress sales. The properties involved are often of less than
stellar quality. There are exceptions, of course; auctions have
occasionally been used in the United States to market unique, high-value
real estate, 98 or to market large quantities of subdivision houses or
condominium units99 in extremely high-demand market conditions.
reason to expect this approach will produce higher prices than in-person auctions, since an on-line
auction can be conducted over several days or weeks, rather than occurring on a single day, thus
exposing the properties to a larger set of prospective buyers.
95. This point is made in Martin Ginsburg, The New Wave of Auctioning Will Not Wash in a
Soft Market, 7 REAL EST. FIN. J. 72 (1991). See also Christopher J. Mayer, Assessing the
Performance of Real Estate Auctions, 26 REAL EST. ECON. 41 (1998).
96. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND
RTC EXPERIENCE 1980-1994 (1998). For an overview of the events leading to the creation of the
RTC, see Edward L. Rubin, Communing with Disaster: What We Can Learn from the Jusen and the
Savings and Loan Crises, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 79 (1997); Jerry W. Markham, Banking
Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 (2000).
97. See Marcus T. Allen, Discounts in Real Estate Auction Prices: Evidence from South
Florida, 69 APPRAISAL J. 3843 (2001); Allen & Swisher, An Analysis of the Price Formation
Process at a HUD Auction, 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 179 (2000).
98. See Mayer, supra note 95; Jim Szymanski, Going Once, Going Twice Real Estate:
Banking on a New Trend, Edgewood Estate Is on the Auction Block, after Six Months with a
Realtor, TACOMA MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE, Feb. 23, 2001, at DI (auction of 17,000 square foot
estate valued at S2 million); Larry Finley, Under the Gavel: Real Estate Auctions Play Big Role in
Builder Closeouts and Bankruptcies, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, July 28, 2000, at IN (auction of 5,000
square foot home on private island, valued at $3 million).
99. See Ryland Sizzles in Bay Area Home Auctions With $10.8 Million in Sales, P.R.
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 16, 2000 (14 new houses in highly desirable location in Bay area, California, sold
in on-line auction for average of $771,300, nearly $25,000 more than average asking price); Randyl
Drummer, Real Estate & Retail: Internet Auction Set for Kaufman & Broad Homes, Ontario,
CALIFORNIA BUSINESS PRESS, Oct. 16, 2000, at 10 (65 new houses in Southern California sold by
internet auction). See also Auctions are Growing in Popularity Again, with Benefits for Both
Developers and Home Buyers: Property Auctions Back in Vogue, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 19, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 17378261.
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Nonetheless, auctions generally have the reputation in America for
offering properties that are substandard or problematic, and that may not
be of interest to a broad segment of the market. This reputation per se
may discourage some prospective buyers from participating.
The quickness with which an auction can be completed is
obviously an advantage to the seller. It can drastically reduce carrying
costs - property taxes, insurance, security, management expense, and
most significantly, the loss of revenue from the seller's capital if the
property is currently vacant or is producing only a submarket income.
00
However, the rapidity of the auction and its "cookie-cutter"
standardization0 1 of the transaction can also discourage potential buyers.
For example, seller financing is difficult to arrange in an auction. There
is no opportunity to engage in face-to-face negotiation of the financing, or
to tailor it to needs and qualifications of an individual buyer. Hence,
unless the seller is willing to negotiate and announce a prearranged
financing package that will be available to all bidders, it will be up to the
bidders to arrange their own financing. 0 2 In addition, auctions usually
call for the successful bidder to make a substantial deposit'0 3 - as much as
10% to 20% of the total price'04 - on the date the auction is held, and to
pay the remainder of the price within a short time. The deposit must
typically be in "good funds," and a personal check is unlikely to be
acceptable. Thus, the bidders must come to the auction armed with letters
of credit, cashiers' checks, or the like, and must have pre-arranged
financing for the rest of the price. 05 This preparation is a considerable
effort for a bidder, particularly in light of the fact that no individual
bidder has any assurance of prevailing at the auction. Only professionals
or quite dedicated and knowledgeable amateurs are likely to bid.
100. See Alan R. Kravets, Going, Going, Gone! Real Estate Auctions in the 90s, PROBATE
AND PROPERTY, May/June1993, at 38.
101. See Kravets, supra note 100: "What contingencies can a prospective purchaser put into
the sales contract? None. The prospective purchaser does not have the ability to renegotiate the sales
contract. This is why the sales agreement drafted by the seller has to be fair and commercially
reasonable."
102. Steven L. Grood & Sheldon Gottlieb, Real Estate Auctions: A Guide for the Seller's
Lanyer, PROBATE & PROPERTY, SeptJOct.1988, at 41.
103. HUD requires only a S2,000 deposit; see Allen & Swisher, supra note 97, at 282. Cf.
Szymanski, supra note 98 ($50,000 deposit required).
104. This is the amount typically required in house auctions in New Zealand; Dotzour, supra
note 92, at 60 and n.2 (1998).
105. Indeed, the seller or auctioneer may require bidders to produce evidence that they are pre-
qualified for financing, in order to weed out those who will be unable to complete the purchase if
they are successful bidders. See Doug LeDuc, Indiana Real Estate Giants to Join in Huge Real
Estate Auction, FT. WAYNENEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 6, 2001, available at 2001 WEL 15016294. In its
auctions of foreclosed houses, HUD requires bidders to have prequalified for purchase financing;
see Allen, supra note 97.
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The sort of standardized contract that is inherent in auctions
argues against their use for some types of properties - those in which
individual negotiation is desirable to deal with idiosyncratic problems.
For example, if the property is in poor physical condition, has structural
problems, or is contaminated with hazardous waste, an auction provides
no way for an individual buyer to arrange for extra inspections or
engineering studies, the creation of an escrowed fund to cover the costs of
remediation, or other creative solutions. 0 6 In these situations, one would
expect an auction to perform relatively poorly in terms of price
maximization, as bidders build "worst-case" estimates of future expenses
into their bids.
Empirical evidence on the capacity of auctions to bring "true"
market prices varies. The effectiveness of auctions probably depends on
the culture of the marketplace. In most areas of the world, real estate
sales by private negotiation far outnumber sales by auction.10 7 However,
there are exceptions. In some parts of Australia and New Zealand,
auctions are often employed to sell desirable high-quality houses. 0 8 The
practice is well established there, and the reported evidence indicates that
those auctions produce prices commanding a significant premium over
negotiated sale prices.109 On the other hand, studies of auctions in the
United States suggest that they nearly always produce selling prices lower
than would be obtained by conventional marketing methods." t0 The
discount borne by the seller in an auction in America varies; it tends to be
greatest when low-quality properties are sold in weak markets, and to be
106. See Lusht, A Comparison of Prices Brought by English Auctions and Private
Negotiations, 24 REAL EST. Eco. 517 (1996); Mayer, supra note 95 (single-site auctions, typically
involving clustered groups of new or relatively new houses, resulted in discounts below expected
negotiated sale prices that were much smaller than scattered-site auctions involving older, more
heterogeneous groups of houses).
107. Lusht, supra note 106, notes that auctions are least likely to be used in Melbourne for
older houses and those in poor condition. In the United States, HUD auctions of previously-
foreclosed houses may include an escrowed fund for repairs, but the amount is set by HUD and may
or may not be satisfactory to a particular bidder; any cost overages must be borne by the buyer. See
Allen & Swisher, supra note 97, at 282.
108. Lusht, supra note 106, reports that in 1988 about 50% of the houses shown for sale in
classified advertisements in Melbourne were listed for sale by auction.
109. See Dotzour et al, supra note 92 (auctioned houses sold for a premium of 5.9% to 9.5%
over houses sold by negotiation in highly desirable areas of Christchurch, New Zealand); Lusht,
supra note 30 (auctioned houses sold for a premium of about 8% over houses sold by negotiation in
middle-priced to high-priced areas of Melbourne, Australia).
110. See Allen & Swisher, supra note 97, at 285 (auctions of HUD-owned houses in Florida
produced prices 17.45% below predicted market values, with greater disparities on the west coast of
Florida and smaller disparities in Miami-Dade County); Mayer, supra note 95 (auctions of houses
in a strong market in Los Angeles produced prices only 1% below expected negotiated sale prices,
while auctions of houses in a weak market in Dallas brought prices 19% to 21% below expected
negotiated sale prices). Mayer, id., also cites unpublished studies showing even greater price
discounts in U.S. auctions, in the range of 33% to 37%.
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least or nearly to disappear when high-quality properties are sold in
strong markets. To some extent, the difference may be explained on the
basis of popular expectations. In Australia and New Zealand, prospective
buyers may think, "This must be a great property, since they're
auctioning it.""' In the United States, prospective buyers are more apt to
think, "This must be a substandard property, since they're auctioning
it."1
12
Additional problems with foreclosure auctions. Foreclosure
auctions raise additional problems that do not arise with other types of
real estate auctions. These problems include (1) the requirement for a
very quick "closing" and payment of the remaining price - often only a
few days;' 3 (2) the absence of any warranty of title or of physical quality
of the property or its improvements;' 4 (3) in many states, the inability of
buyers to inspect the property or to obtain inspections by professionals
prior to the auction;" 5 and (4) the uncertainties created by the fact that the
title passed at the sale will be subject to any other mortgages or liens that
11I. See Lusht, supra note 30 (real estate agents surveyed in Melbourne, Australia, estimated
that an auction would produce a mean price premium of 11% over a negotiated sale, with a range of
5% to 15%; during the period studied, 74% of the houses in the area studied were sold by auction
and 26% by negotiated sale).
112. See Greg Botonis, No Gift-wrapped Houses: Bidders Balk at Holiday Real Estate
Auction, L.A. TIs.S, Dec. 11, 2000, at AVI (no bids made on attempted auction of 60 houses in
Lancaster, California). But see Michael Paulk, Auctions a Growing Option in Residential Real
Estate Sales, MMPIHIS Bus. J., June 2, 2000, at 28, suggesting that the low-quality image of real
estate auctions in the U.S. is changing, Lidia Kelly, Real Estate Auction Popular for High-End
Properties, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 2000, at D2 (same); Jolie Gorchov, Kenncdy-Wilson
Takes Real Estate Auctions Online, L.A. Bus. J., Jan. 24,2000, at 75 (same).
113. Non-distress auctions often allow considerable time - say, 30 to 60 days after the auction
- for payment of the remainder of the price. See Allen & Swisher, supra note 97 (HUD allows 30
days, but gives a cash rebate of S450 to S900 if closing occurs within 15 days); Lusht, supra note
106 (Australian practice allows 60 days after auction to close); Sentementes, supra note 94 (U.S.
auction company allows buyer 30 days to sign contract and make 5% deposit, and an additional 30
days to close); Kelly, supra note 112 (U.S. auction company allows buyers 30 days to close). By
comparison, foreclosures commonly require the buyer to pay the full remaining price within 5 to 10
days. See Debra P. Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and E41icknc of
Foreclosures and a Proposalfor Reform, 30 MICH. J. L. REFORM 639, 649 (1997) (Illinois practice
allows only 48 hours).
114. HUD auctions are also "as-is," with no warranty of physical quality; see Allen, supra
note. However, in other non-distress auctions a %waranty may be offered by the seller.
115. HUD permits and encourages inspections prior to auction by prospective bidders; see
Allen, supra note 29. Non-distress auction sales, in the United States and elsewvhere, nearly always
permit preinspection by bidders. See Lusht supra note 106 (preinspections of houses sold by
auction in Melbourne). Foreclosure sales are another matter. In most U.S. states the mortgagor will
remain in possession of the property until the foreclosure (or even aftenvard, during a statutory
redemption period, if any). Hence, inspection is dependent on the mortgagor's cooperation, which
in most cases is not likely to be forthcoming. In Connecticut it is customary for the debtor to permit
inspection, but there is no legal recourse if the debtor refuses to do so; see Denis R. Caron,
CONNEcTCuT FORECLOSLURES § 6.01G (1997); Second Mat'7 Bank ofNen' Haven r. Burtchell, 166
Conn. 388, 392-93, 349 A.2d 831, 833 (1974).
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have higher priority than the mortgage being foreclosed, and even to
mortgages or liens lower in priority if their owners have not been properly
made parties to the foreclosure proceeding."l 6 Because of this last factor,
no knowledgeable individual will bid at a foreclosure sale without first
having obtained a preliminary title report and commitment to insure from
a title insurance company. This is an additional element of advance
preparation to bid, one that would usually be handled by a real estate
agent in a negotiated sale.
In about twenty American states, there is a further uncertainty for
foreclosure auction buyers that derives from the right of "statutory
redemption." In these states the former mortgagor (and in some cases,
sold-out junior lien holders) can "redeem" the property after the
foreclosure sale by buying it back from the foreclosure purchaser." 7 The
right is time-limited, lasting from a few weeks to a year, depending on the
state. If the right is exercised, the foreclosure bidder must give up the
property, and will receive a "refund" of the amount bid, and in some
states interest and reimbursement for expenditures such as taxes,
insurance, and improvements. In theory the right of statutory redemption
is supposed to encourage higher bids, with bidders setting their prices
high enough to make redemption uneconomical. In reality, however, the
result is probably just the contrary. Since a foreclosure purchaser in a
state with statutory redemption can have no assurance that she or he will
be able to keep the property after buying at the sale, many potential third-
party purchasers are probably discouraged from participating in the
process at all, 118 thus reducing competition and lowering ultimate prices
paid.
The marketing effort that precedes foreclosure auctions in the
United States is laughably inadequate when compared with non-distress
real estate auctions. The professionals who sell real estate at auction
know that very substantial advance efforts are essential to ensure that
many bidders are present, that they have the information they need to bid,
and that they are qualified bidders. To accomplish this in non-foreclosure
auctions, a bidder's package of materials is usually made widely available
to prospective bidders, and will include plans, photographs, surveys,
inspection reports, appraisals, title reports and underlying documents,
116. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, at § 7.15 for a discussion of the problem of the
"omitted party." HUD guarantees the title to the foreclosed houses that it auctions; see Allen, supra
note 97. However, there is typically no such seller's warranty in a foreclosure sale.
117. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 1, at §§ 8.4-8.7.
118. Id. at § 8.4, pp. 611-12; Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by
Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure - An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent
Resale, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 850, 860-61 (1985); Comment, Statutory Redemption: The Enemy of
Home Financing, 28 WASH. L. REV. 39 (1953).
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condominium formation documents, and a copy of the intended contract
of sale to the successful bidder. If the property is rented, copies of the
leases, financial statements, and service contracts may be included in the
package. 19 As noted above, ample pre-auction opportunity for bidders to
inspect the property -will also be provided.
In foreclosure auctions, by contrast, the only "marketing" is
typically a classified advertisement in the local newspaper that gives the
legal description of the land and perhaps a little additional information,
such as its street address and the type of improvements located on it. A
notice may also be recorded in the public records and posted on the land
itself, containing the same data. It is up to the individual bidders to
accumulate the additional information they need to formulate intelligent
bids. The foreclosing mortgagee may or may not have this information,
and may or may not be cooperative in passing it to prospective bidders.
The result of all of these factors is that prices bid at foreclosure
sales are often well below the fair market value of the property being
foreclosed.12 0  In most cases, the successful bids is made by the lender
who holds the loan, and there are no bids at all by third parties in many
cases.121 Of course, if a bid is made by the mortgage lender, the lender
has already invested the amount of the loan balance in the property, so
that in economic terms it matters little whether the lender bids the full
loan balance, a nominal amount such as one dollar, or any amount in
between. Nevertheless, the absence of third party bidders may give the
lender an opportunity to deprive the borrower of significant economic
value, either by (1) bidding less than the property's value, so as to deprive
the borrower of the opportunity to recover a surplus from the sale, or (2)
bidding less than both the value and the debt, so as to create a liability for
a deficiency on the part of the borrower.in
Empirical evidence of adequacy of foreclosure prices. The
statements in the foregoing paragraph should not be taken as an assertion
that most or nearly all foreclosure auctions bring inadequate prices. Two
empirical studies done in recent years shed considerable light on the
119. See KIavets, supra note 100.
120. See Washburn, supra note 89, at 848-50; Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass:
Foreclosure by Sale As De Facto Strict Foreclosure - An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure
and Subsequent Resale, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 850 (1985); Stark, supra note 113.
121. The lender has the advantage of being able to make a "credit bid" in any amount up to the
balance owing on the mortgage debt without having to put up any cash. See Washburn, supra note
89, at 849-51. Professor Debra Stark's study of foreclosures in Cook County, Illinois indicated that
third parties (those other than the lender) were the successfiul bidders in only 9.6% to 11.2% of all
judicial foreclosure sales; Stark, supra note 113, at 663.
122. Stark found that this actually occurred in only 6% to 7% of the foreclosures in Cook
County, Illinois; see Stark, supra note 113, at 665.
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issue. Professor Debra Stark's study of foreclosures in Cook County,
Illinois during 1993 and 1994 revealed that lenders who purchased at
their own foreclosure sales were able to resell the property at a profit1
2 3
only about 10% to 20% of the time.12 4 Third party bidders (although less
commonly successful bidders) did much better; in Stark's 1993 study
they resold the foreclosed property at a profit in 75% of the cases, and
their profits were often quite substantial, ranging from 32% to 326% of
the bid amount.' 2
5
Professor Steven Wechsler reported similar results in a study of
foreclosures in Onondaga County, New York in 1979. Wechsler found
that when mortgagees purchased at their own foreclosures, they were able
to resell the properties at a profit in about half of all cases. 12 6 When third
parties purchased, Wechsler found that they were much more likely than
mortgagees to make a profit upon resale, and that the profits they made
were, typically much larger than those made by mortgagees. The data
from these two studies suggest that submarket sale prices, while not
occurring in the majority of foreclosure, are nonetheless a significant
problem and effectively rob many borrowers of considerable economic
value.1
2 7
123. When a bidder makes a profit upon resale of the foreclosed property (after taking the
bidder's holding and marketing costs into account), that is fairly strong evidence that the bid price
was sub-market. The only alternative explanation for the profit is a general rise in real estate prices
in the market between the date of the foreclosure and the date of the resale. Stark considered only
resales within one year of the foreclosure; Stark, supra note 113, at 665. Wechsler found that about
95% of the resales occurred within 2 years of the foreclosure. Wechsler, supra note 118, at 879-
880. There is no indication that unusually rapid market price increases were occurring during the
relevant periods.
124. Id. at 667. In determining whether a profit was made, Stark estimated a cost to the
successful bidder of 10% of the foreclosure bid to account for a sales commission on resale and for
holding costs, such as property taxes, insurance, and management expense. While profits to lender
were relatively rare, in two cases lender made very large profits of 98% and 379%; id. at 668.
125. Id.
126. Wechsler's profit data are not directly comparable with Stark's because Wechsler made
no allowance for the successful bidder's cost of holding and reselling the property. However, the
median loan balance on the mortgages he studied was about $20,000, so median holding costs
consistent with Stark's estimates would have been about $2,000. Wechsler, supra note 118, at 872.
Wechsler reported that in cases in which the mortgagee made a profit, the median profit was about
$5,000. Id. at 880. Hence, his results are consistent with Stark's, suggesting that mortgagees made
a profit in a substantial number, but less than half, of the foreclosure purchases.
127. Borrowers are not always harmed by inadequate foreclosure prices. In the ease of
mortgagee bidders who do not intend to seek a deficiency, there is no economic difference between
a bid of $I and a bid equal to the full amount owing on the mortgage debt, since with any bid in this
range, the mortgagor will not be entitled to any surplus. Most lenders do not seek deficiencies most
of the time. Wechsler found that a lender obtained a deficiency judgment in only one case out of 94
foreclosures in his study in which a deficiency existed; Wechsler, supra note 118, at 878. Stark
found that lenders pursued deficiency judgments in about 28% and 13% of the eases she studied in
1993 and 1994, respectively; Stark, supra note 113, at 664.
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The legal response to price inadequacy. A variety of techniques
have been developed by courts and legislatures to forestall these
results.128 Judges may set aside foreclosure sales for price inadequacy,
but only if the price is "grossly inadequate" or "shocks the conscience" of
the court;129 only extremely low prices are likely to fall within such a
definition. 30 In a number of states, statutes require that a court make a
determination of fair market value, and use that value for the purpose of
computing deficiency judgments.1 3 1  Another more stringent measure,
adopted in California, is to simply to prohibit the obtaining of deficiency
judgments in most situations. 32 These techniques have had some success,
but at the cost of impeding flexibility and making the foreclosure process
more cumbersome.
It is perhaps surprising that few American states have considered
alternatives to auction sales as foreclosure mechanisms. In about 20
states, a so-called "power of sale" may be given to a mortgage lender,
133
but this simply allows a trustee designated by the lender to conduct the
auction without court supervision. Some savings of time and attorneys'
fees result, and most lenders in the states that authorize "power of sale"
foreclosure consider it the preferable method of foreclosure and use it
routinely. But it does nothing to eliminate the inherent problems of
auction sales and the absence of warranties mentioned above.
The Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA), and the Uniform
Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA which was derived from ULTA), both
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, attempted to introduce greater flexibility into the foreclosure
process in the United States. To a considerable extent the foreclosure
provisions of these acts were derived from Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which covers security interests in personal property.
These acts provided that foreclosure sales were not strictly limited to an
auction format, but could be conducted in any "reasonable" manner,134 a
provision derived from Article 9's requirement of "commercially
reasonable" dispositions of personal property. 135  This flexibility was
viewed as unacceptable vagueness in the state legislatures, and for this
128. See Washburn, supra note 89.
129. RESTATMENT (TIIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 8.3 (1997).
130. The RESTATEMENT suggests a rule of thumb, based on a review of the case law, that a
price less than 20% of market value is "grossly inadequate;" id. at § 8.3 cmt. b.
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 8.4 (1997) adopts this rule and
lists 15 states that follow it by statute; id. at Reporters' Note to cmt. b.
132. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 2, at § 8.3.
133. Id. at § 7.19.
134. U.L.S.LA. § 509(a);
135. See Marion W. Benfield, WastedDays and Wasted Nights: 1W7z, Mhe LandActs Failcd 20
NOVAL. REv. 1037, 1049 (1996).
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reason (among numerous others), neither of these uniform acts was
adopted by any state in the United States.
There is precedent in England for such a flexible approach to
mortgage foreclosure. The term "power of sale" is used in English
mortgages, but it has a greatly different meaning than that employed in
the United States. Under an English "power of sale," the lender is
permitted to foreclose simply by selling the real estate to any buyer other
than itself or its agents. 136 The price must be reasonable, although it need
not be shown to be the highest possible price obtainable. Lenders in
England commonly use real estate brokers ("estate agents") and other
means of conducting foreclosure sales, just as with other sales of real
property. Foreclosures by judicial sale (auction) are also permissible,137
but are rare in practice.
Perhaps there is an inherent mistrust of lenders in America, which
translates into a sense that foreclosures must be rather strictly regulated or
borrowers - and especially homeowners - will be taken advantage of
The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (UNFA), currently in the
drafting process under the sponsorship of the Commissioners on Uniform
Laws, attempts to combine the flexibility of the English and
ULTA/ULSIA approaches with this need for careful regulation of
lenders. 138  In brief, the UNFA recognizes three distinct foreclosure
methods available to lenders. The first is the auction sale, which (like the
statutes of more than 20 American states) may be held without judicial
supervision. 139 However, lenders have two alternatives. The first, termed
"foreclosure by negotiated sale," permits the lender to enter into a
contract of sale for the property with a buyer. The lender may use brokers
or any other means of marketing the property for this purpose. The
lender, having arranged for such a sale, then notifies the borrower of its
terms, and also states a price that the lender is willing to credit against the
debt. This price need not be identical to the contract price that the lender
has arranged with the third party buyer, but the contract price gives the
borrower at least one reference point in determining whether to accept the
lender's offer.
136. Law of Property Act §§ 101-107 (1925); Bernard Rudden & Hywel Moseley, NOTES ON
MORTGAGES, 52-57 (3d ed.1967).
137. Id. at 67.
138. Descriptions of UNFA here are based on preliminary drafts, and changes may occur
before the act is adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws. The act
is expected to be presented for final reading at the annual meeting of the Conference in Tucson,
Arizona in Summer 2002.
139. The UNFA gives the lender the power to conduct this sort of sale personally, while nearly
all of the American states recognizing a similar power require that it be exercised by a trustee who
is, at least nominally, distinct from the lender. This distinction is hardly meaningful, since the
trustee may, in most states, be an employee or attorney of the lender.
[15:1
HeinOnline  -- 15 Colum. J. Asian L. 76 2001-2002
CHINESE MORTGAGE LAW
The third method of foreclosure authorized by the UNFA, termed
"foreclosure by appraisal," permits the lender to obtain and give to the
debtor an appraisal of the property, and to accompany it with an offer of a
proposed net amount that the lender agrees to allow in return for taking
title to the property. This latter method is somewhat like strict
foreclosure, in the sense that the lender vinds up owning the real estate.
In both of these latter methods of foreclosure, the debtor and the
holders of junior interests given an opportunity to decide whether to
accept or reject the lender's proffered offer. The proposed selling price of
the property (in the case of "foreclosure by negotiated sale") or the
appraised value of the property (in the case of "foreclosure by appraisal")
provides some information that can help these parties decide whether to
accept the lender's offer or not. However, the lender's offer may be
lower or higher than negotiated sale price or the appraised value. If the
lender's offer is rejected, the usual result is that the proposed foreclosure
by negotiate sale or by appraisal is dropped, and the foreclosure must be
carried out under the traditional auction format instead.
If the lender's offer under either of these latter methods of
foreclosure is a reasonable one, the debtor and junior lien holders are
likely to accept it, particularly in light of the widely-recognized fact that
auction foreclosure sales rarely bring fair market value. However, if the
debtor or juniors insist on having an auction sale, that is their right.
Hence, no debtor protections are lost as a consequence of availability of
the other two methods of foreclosure. In most cases it is believed that
lenders will use these other methods and 'will make reasonable offers,
which it will be in the interest of debtors and junior interest-holders to
accept. In the long run, both lenders and debtors should be better off-
lenders because they can avoid some the delays and uncertainties
associated with auction sales, and debtors because they will in general be
credited with higher prices for their properties, thus reducing their risk of
deficiency liability and increasing the probability of a surplus.
The acts adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws are not binding on any state; they become law
only if and as individual state legislatures adopt them. UNFA may meet
the same fate as its predecessors, ULTA and ULSIA, and fail to be
adopted in any state. But there is reason to hope and expect that its
creative approach to foreclosure, combined with the fact that about 20
American states have no non-judicial foreclosure process and are
therefore likely targets for adoption, will result in UNFA's having a
significant impact on American foreclosure law.
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Chinese law comparison. Under Chinese law, if there is a default
in payment of the mortgage debt, the mortgagor and mortgagee may agree
to sell the property or otherwise liquidate it, and to apply the proceeds
toward the debt. 140 The sale may presumably be made in any manner to
which the parties agree. However, if no agreement is reached, at present
the sole method of foreclosing a mortgage in China appears to be by
court-ordered auction.141 Licensed auction specialists are used for this
purpose. 142 Ordinarily all mortgages on the same property are foreclosed
together, with the proceeds distributed to the mortgage holders in the
order of their priority. 
143
Is the auction an effective method of disposition of real estate in
China? Auctions have often been used by the Chinese government to
place initial granted land use rights to large parcels of surplus real estate
in private hands. 44 On the other hand, resales of individual parcels by
private owners are more likely to be conducted by negotiations assisted
by real estate brokers, although auctions are sometimes used, especially
with very large and valuable parcels. 145  Small parcels or ordinary
residential units are likely to be resold at auction only if they exist in an
140. Chinese Security Law, Art. 53.
141. Urban Real Estate Law Art. 46; Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, at § 8.14.2. The
Security Law provides no details of the foreclosure procedure, but merely states that the mortgagee
may bring an action in a People's Court; Chinese Security Law, Art. 53.
142. Chinese Auction Law, Art.9.
143. Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, at 8.14.3. The 2000 Interpretations of the Supreme
People's Court suggest that a form of "deed in lieu of foreclosure" (to use American terminology),
in which the foreclosed property is transferred to the mortgagee rather than being auctioned, is
possible. See 2000 Interpretations, Art. 57:
"If the parties to a mortgage contract stipulate therein that the ownership of the mortgaged
property will pass to the creditor if the mortgagee has not received fulfillment of the obligation at
the expiration of the term for the performance of such obligation, such stipulation is void. * * * If
the mortgagee has not received fulfillment of the obligation at the expiration of the term for
performance of such obligation, the mortgagee and mortgagor may agree that the mortgagee obtain
the mortgaged property subsequent to its evaluation in terms of money."
Thus, the agreement to give a "deed in lieu of foreclosure" must be not only subsequent to the
original mortgage (just as in American practice, so as to avoid the deed being struck down as a
"clog on the equity of redemption"), but also subsequent to a court's evaluation of the property (a
protection for borrowers than American practice does not offer, and which may well be useful in
helping a borrower avoid giving up more value than necessary to cover the balance owing on the
debt).
144. See e.g., Real Estate: Beiing to Auction Land-Use Rights, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan.
24, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4105146 (government auction of 200,000 square meters of land,
vacated by five factories, for residential development); Randolph & Lou, supra note 2, at 148-150.
Land auctions have also been widely used in Hong Kong to place large tracts of government-owned
land in the hands of private developers; see Stephen Ching, EXAMINING COMPETITION IN LAND
MARKET: AN APPLICATION OF EVENT STUDY TO LAND AUCTIONS IN HONG KONG, 6-7 (Research
Working Paper, University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economics, Feb. 2001).
145. E-mail message from Professor Lou Jianbo to the author, July 24, 2001.
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overheated market characterized by extremely strong demand, 146 much as
has sometimes occurred in the United States in similar circumstances.1
47
If auction resales of land use rights become a widespread and
customary method of marketing individual parcels and dwelling units in
China, then there is certainly no objection to the use of the auction as a
foreclosure device. However, if negotiated sales of real estate are more
commonly used in ordinary sale transactions, as currently appears to be
true, it would be desirable to amend the existing law to permit court-
ordered negotiated sales in foreclosure as well, or even to adopt a
nonjudicial procedure for negotiated sales as is done in England 48 and
would be permitted by the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act'49 in the
United States. If there is concern that giving lenders an unfettered right to
sell the property would be too broad a right, and too subject to abuse, the
concepts of the UNFA described above might be considered as a means
of constraining the power of lenders while still allowing them to use
standard market mechanisms for disposing of property. The overriding
objective should be for foreclosed properties to bring prices comparable
to those that would be derived from non-distress market sales.
V. CONCLUSION
The experience of the United States, and increasingly the
experience of other developed nations, has shown that an efficient private
market in mortgage finance can provide enormous benefits to a country's
citizens. Such a market can minimize the costs of homeownership and
rental of dwellings, and can also keep the prices of all internally-
manufactured and distributed goods low, since as those prices inevitably
reflect the costs paid by firms for their land and buildings.
Chinese government authorities seem well aware of these
benefits, and have attempted to design a legal regime that will support an
efficient mortgage market. In many ways they have been remarkably
successful. However, the legal regime's effectiveness is undercut to some
extent by a combination of ambiguous legal provisions, unnecessary
restrictions on some types of mortgage transactions, and a lack of
flexibility in methods of foreclosure of mortgages. I have attempted here
to identify some of the changes needed to cure these problems. The
needed changes are not vast, and should not be politically charged. If
146. E-mail message from Professor Patrick Randolph to the author, July 23. 2001.
147. See supra text accompanying note 99.
148. See supra text accompanying note 136.
149. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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they are made, the benefits for China's citizens can be extremely
significant.
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